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Sexual harassment law and family leave policy originated as feminist reform
projects designed to protect women in the workplace. But many academics now ask
whether harassment and leave policies have outgrown their gendered roots. The
anti-bullying movement advocates taking the “sexual” out of harassment law to
prohibit all forms of on-the-job mistreatment. Likewise, the work-life balance
movement advocates taking the “family” out of leave policy to require employers
to accommodate all types of life pursuits. These proposals are in line with recent
cases and scholarship on civil rights that reframe problems once seen as issues of
inequality as deprivations of liberty or dignity. I refer to this trend as the universal
turn in workplace protections.
This Article urges caution with respect to the universal turn. Drawing on
feminist legal and political theory, it provides a set of questions to ask in evaluating
proposals to universalize protections. It concludes that anti-bullying and work-life
proposals are likely to dilute feminist workplace gains and mask inequality. If the
universal rule swallows the antidiscrimination rule, the transformative potential of
requiring employers and the public to scrutinize the workplace for gender
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discrimination is lost. Sexual harassment is seen as no worse than personality
conflicts, and recreational pursuits are supported to the same extent as caretaking
responsibilities. The benefits of sexual harassment law and leave policy are likely
to be diluted.
I therefore oppose universal approaches to harassment and work-life conflicts
that would simply expand civil rights protections to cover harms other than
discrimination. Instead of the universal turn, this Article proposes a hybrid
approach focused on inclusivity that would expand protections incrementally
without abandoning equality.
INTRODUCTION
There is no “general civility code for the American workplace.”1 If you are
barraged with vicious insults on the job or you are so overworked that you cannot
maintain your sanity, chances are, you have no legal remedy. Legal protections
attach only if the poor treatment was based on sex or another protected
characteristic. Sexual harassment law and family leave originated as policies to
redress injuries to women. The paradigmatic cases: a woman suffers hostile sexual
advances from a male supervisor,2 or is fired for taking time off to have a child.3 As
required by the principle of formal equality, men too could bring sexual harassment
cases4 or take time off for children.5 In many workplaces, the prevailing idea of
sexual harassment has further expanded to include almost all forms of on-the-job
sexual expression,6 and the concept of family responsibilities has further expanded
to include new forms of caretaking, such as care for elderly parents.7 But these
workplace protections remain moored to gender, sex, and family.
A trend is now emerging to abandon these moorings. Many scholars propose
expanding actionable forms of harassment beyond the sexual, to nonsexual
workplace bullying.8 Likewise, scholars propose expanding leave policy beyond

1. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998).
2. See, e.g., Meritor Sav. Bank, F.S.B. v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 60 (1986).
3. See, e.g., Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 278 (1987).
4. See generally Aimee L. Widor, Comment, Fact or Fiction?: Role-Reversal Sexual
Harassment in the Modern Workplace, 58 U. PITT. L. REV. 225 (1996) (discussing sexual
harassment cases involving male victims and female perpetrators).
5. See, e.g., Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 731, 734 (2003)
(stating that the Family and Medical Leave Act, which allows men and women to take jobprotected, unpaid family leave, was justified as remedial legislation because the states had
“differential leave policies” for men and women “not attributable to any differential physical
needs of men and women, but rather to the pervasive sex-role stereotype that caring for
family members is women’s work”).
6. See Vicki Schultz, The Sanitized Workplace, 112 YALE L.J. 2061, 2107 (2003)
(explaining how managers have translated Title VII into a ban on any expression of sexuality
in the workplace).
7. See Joan C. Williams & Stephanie Bornstein, The Evolution of “FReD”: Family
Responsibilities Discrimination and Developments in the Law of Stereotyping and Implicit
Bias, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 1311, 1320−21 (2008).
8. See, e.g., Susan Harthill, The Need for a Revitalized Regulatory Scheme to Address
Workplace Bullying in the United States: Harnessing the Federal Occupational Safety and
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family responsibilities, to allow all workers flexibility to manage their various life
pursuits.9 On this view, policies originally intended for women would become
universalized, changing dominant norms not just for women but for all workers.
Some scholars envision universal protections as the end goal in the evolution of
sexual harassment law and maternity leave to a “general civility code for the
American workplace.”10 The European workplace is often held out as the ideal,
with its more capacious concept of harassment (there referred to as “mobbing”) and
more generous support for nonwork activities.
These proposals are part of a larger trend—which I refer to as the “universal
turn”—of expanding civil rights protections beyond rules that prohibit
discrimination to rules of universal applicability.11 Antidiscrimination scholars

Health Act, 78 U. CIN. L. REV. 1250 (2010); David C. Yamada, Workplace Bullying and
American Employment Law: A Ten-Year Progress Report and Assessment, 32 COMP. LAB. L.
& POL’Y J. 251 (2010); Brady Coleman, Shame, Rage and Freedom of Speech: Should the
United States Adopt European “Mobbing” Laws?, 35 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 53 (2006);
William R. Corbett, The Need for a Revitalized Common Law of the Workplace, 69 BROOK.
L. REV. 91 (2003); Catherine L. Fisk, Humiliation at Work, 8 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L.
73 (2001); Rosa Ehrenreich, Dignity and Discrimination: Toward a Pluralistic
Understanding of Workplace Harassment, 88 GEO. L.J. 1 (1999).
9. See, e.g., Rachel Arnow-Richman, Incenting Flexibility: The Relationship Between
Public Law and Voluntary Action in Enhancing Work/Life Balance, 42 CONN. L. REV. 1081,
1108−09 (2010); Chai R. Feldblum, Policy Challenges and Opportunities for Workplace
Flexibility: The State of Play, in WORK-LIFE POLICIES 251, 270 (Ann C. Crouter & Alan
Booth eds., 2009); ARIANE HEGEWISCH & JANET C. GORNICK, INST. FOR WOMEN’S POLICY
RESEARCH, STATUTORY ROUTES TO WORKPLACE FLEXIBILITY IN CROSS-NATIONAL
PERSPECTIVE (2008), available at http://www.iwpr.org/publications/pubs/statutory-routes-toworkplace-flexibility-in-cross-national-perspective-b258/at_download/file; Deborah
L.
Rhode, Balanced Lives, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 834, 835 (2002); Mary Anne Case, How High
the Apple Pie? A Few Troubling Questions About Where, Why, and How the Burden of Care
for Children Should Be Shifted, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1753 (2001); Katherine M. Franke,
Theorizing Yes: An Essay on Feminism, Law, and Desire, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 181 (2001);
Vicki Schultz, Life’s Work, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1881 (2000).
10. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998); see infra Parts
I.A.3 & I.B.3.
11. For purposes of this Article, I define “universal rules” as the standards that result
when civil rights laws are expanded beyond enumerated bases for prohibiting discrimination
or requiring accommodation. The universal approach can be contrasted to the enumerative
approach of protection on grounds such as sex, race, and sexual orientation, or the targeted
approach of protecting or prohibiting certain forms of behavior due to links to discrimination
or subordination on these enumerated grounds. I do not define universal rules simply as rules
that apply equally to men and women. As discussed above, supra notes 4−5, many
traditional antidiscrimination protections have always provided symmetrical protections to
men and women. The universal turn goes further to provide a floor of protection regardless
of discrimination. Nor do I refer to traditional labor standards (i.e., the minimum wage as
opposed to equal pay) that do not find antecedents in antidiscrimination laws. I am interested
specifically in the “turn” away from targeted protections toward universal ones, and whether
it can fulfill antidiscrimination goals. I also note that advocates of universalizing rules may
or may not prioritize antidiscrimination goals. Compare Yamada, supra note 8 (arguing for
anti-bullying rules to ensure worker dignity), with Schultz, supra note 9 (arguing for reduced
work hours to loosen the gendered division of labor).
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have embraced universal approaches with lofty rhetoric. For example, Kenji
Yoshino is sympathetic to judicial efforts to frame cases not as rights to equality,
“but as cases touching on rights that, like a rising tide, will lift the boat of every
person in America.”12 The shift to universal protection has two potential virtues.
First, it accords with critical theories of identity in that it changes the focus from
protected status characteristics to protected or prohibited activities. This is
connected to the insights of antidiscrimination theorists that the new generation of
sex discrimination is based not on the belief in women’s inferiority, but on
gendered norms of behavior13 or stereotypes about family responsibilities for both
women and men.14 Second, universalism seems to sidestep the equal versus special
rights debate. Unlike projects perceived as redistributing resources based on group
differences, universal policies may not have stigmatizing effects on members of the

12. KENJI YOSHINO, COVERING: THE HIDDEN ASSAULT ON OUR CIVIL RIGHTS 192 (2006).
Two cases representative of this shift are Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), in which
the Supreme Court struck down a Texas law criminalizing sodomy not on the ground that it
discriminated on the basis of sexual orientation, but rather on the ground that it violated the
liberty interest in sexual intimacy, and Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004), in which the
Court recognized a constitutional claim when a courthouse was not wheelchair accessible,
not on the ground that it discriminated on the basis of disability, but on the ground that it
violated the universal right of access to courts. YOSHINO, supra, at 187−88; see also Kenji
Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 12 HARV. L. REV. 747, 749 (2011) (refining this
argument to provisionally advocate a shift in equal protection jurisprudence by the Court
towards acknowledgement of the “links between liberty and equality,” with an emphasis on
liberty); Martha Albertson Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equality in the
Human Condition, 20 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1, 21 (2008) (“Because the shared, universal
nature of vulnerability draws the whole of society—not just a defined minority—under
scrutiny, the vulnerability approach might be deemed a ‘post-identity’ analysis of what sort
of protection society owes its members.”); Fisk, supra note 8, at 95 (“The development of a
jurisprudence of workplace respect for all persons is the unfinished business of the project of
feminist jurisprudence.”); Vicki Schultz & Allison Hoffman, The Need for a Reduced
Workweek in the United States, in PRECARIOUS WORK, WOMEN AND THE NEW ECONOMY: THE
CHALLENGE TO LEGAL NORMS 131, 133 (Judy Fudge & Rosemary Owens eds., 2006)
(arguing that the advantages of a shortened workweek demonstrate that “equality for women
can best be achieved through universal measures that benefit all workers”).
13. See Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104, 1106, 1112 (9th Cir. 2006)
(en banc) (holding that the requirement that women, but not men, wear makeup at work was
not impermissible sex stereotyping under Title VII); Tristin K. Green, Discomfort at Work:
Workplace Assimilation Demands and the Contact Hypothesis, 86 N.C. L. REV. 379, 396−97
(2008).
14. See Back v. Hastings on Hudson Union Free Sch. Dist., 365 F.3d 107, 125 n.16 (2d
Cir. 2004) (holding that because of “‘cognitive biases,’ which cause people to ignore or
exclude information that is inconsistent with a stereotype . . . [e]ven a subtle reversal in
evaluations [of an employee] that is consistent with stereotypical views about mothers, . . .
(for example, that an employee no longer seems dedicated to her work, or is no longer able
to work efficiently or complete her work in a timely fashion) suggests pretext [for
discrimination]”); Enforcement Guidance, Unlawful Disparate Treatment of Workers with
Caregiving
Responsibilities,
No.
915.002,
EEOC
(May
23,
2007),
http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/caregiving.html.
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disadvantaged group.15 Thus, universalism would seem to be the best route to
undermining the gendered division of labor to give all people more meaningful
choices in configuring work and life.16
But is the universalist story of gradually expanding protection really one of
progress? Will policies that embody universalist thinking avoid essentialist notions
of identity and allow contestation of stereotypes? Will they avoid the destructive
backlash and identity politics that sometimes result from civil rights rules? Or will
the new universalism create new problems of inequality, by requiring all workers to
assimilate to biased norms masquerading as neutral rules, and by diluting
protections for those who need them most? This Article takes up these questions in
two specific policy contexts: workplace anti-bullying rules and work-life
accommodations. It contributes to the debate over universalism by arguing that
these examples demonstrate a paradox: gender issues may point to larger problems
with the structure of the workplace, but universal solutions may create new gender
issues.
Proponents of universalism seek to avoid “essentialism,” or entrenching certain
fixed notions of gender and other aspects of identity in the law. To do so,
universalists move away from equality-based justifications toward norms such as
civility, dignity, liberty, and citizenship. Yet values like dignity could take on
gendered dimensions, becoming tools of social conservatism or sexual repression,17
and policies based on liberty risk reinforcing the fiction that workers are radically
free to make choices, rather than constrained by a set of choices constructed by
legal regimes, economic circumstances, and social expectations.18 For example, the
focus on bullying may be a welcome departure from old stereotypes about female
victims and male aggressors in sexual harassment cases, but it also opens
opportunities for new scapegoats, such as the demanding female boss labeled a
bully for defying traditional gender roles. And the shifting nomenclature from
work-family to work-life does not necessarily correspond with any shifting social
meaning. If only motherhood is culturally supported as an extracurricular activity,
the transition in labels from “maternity leave” to “family leave” to “caretaker
leave” to “work-life balance” reflects no more than a gesture toward political
correctness. Even worse, work-life accommodations inevitably involve managers in
making judgments about whose “life” is more worthy of accommodation, allowing
enforcement of class, race, and gender biases.

15. See NANCY FRASER, JUSTICE INTERRUPTUS 25 (1997) (arguing that policy premised
on group differences “tends to set in motion a . . . stigmatizing . . . recognition dynamic,
which contradicts its official commitment to universalism”).
16. For an argument against the gendered division of labor, see Vicki Schultz, Feminism
and Workplace Flexibility, 42 CONN. L. REV. 1203, 1206 (2010) (“When some people
(historically, disproportionately women) find it difficult to participate meaningfully in paid
work and other people (historically, disproportionately men) find it difficult to participate
meaningfully in family life, basic principles of gender equality are violated.”).
17. See infra notes 228–29 and accompanying text.
18. Cf. Katherine M. Franke, The Domesticated Liberty of Lawrence v. Texas, 104
COLUM. L. REV. 1399, 1419 (2004) (arguing that the “orientation-blindness” of the same-sex
marriage as private liberty project masks its core heteronormativity: homosexual
relationships are recognized only to the extent they mimic heterosexual relationships).
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Universal solutions are also thought to avoid backlash, in other words, the
counterproductive effects of identity politics, including stigmatization of the
identity group seeking recognition and polarization of discussion that undermines
efforts to transform institutions to achieve inclusivity. Backlash is dangerous in
terms of equality because it may transfer the costs of the new policy to the
disadvantaged group. But enacting more expansive workplace rules may not diffuse
the backlash, particularly if the new rules are individualistic policies that pit the
interests of certain workers against others—for example, “bullies” versus
“victims,” or workers who want time off for volunteering versus parents who want
time off for caretaking.
Universal policies may also have disadvantages in terms of worsening the
gendered division of labor. I refer to these disadvantages as the risks of
“assimilation” and “dilution.” As feminist legal theorists have long argued,
universal protections may only or primarily assist workers who assimilate to
dominant norms tailored to “model” workers who are typically young, married,
white, heterosexual, affluent, and male.19 For example, flexible work arrangements
may be most helpful to married men who use the advantages of flexibility to
engage in more paid labor rather than housework.20 Women are more likely to have
caretaking duties, and therefore to be unable to assimilate to this model. Notions of
race, class, gender, and sexuality will also play into whether a court recognizes an
indignity as bullying.
Assimilation is a risk not just for individuals but also for equality-based social
movements. If the focus of harassment law shifts from discrimination to dignity,
we may lose sight of how harassment can be part of a project of maintaining the
workplace as a site of male privilege. Feminist movements might be assimilated
into broader movements for workers’ rights. Universalizing projects lend credence
to the zeitgeist of “post-gender idealism.”21 The race between Barack Obama and
Hillary Clinton for the 2008 Democratic nomination for president caused many to
ask whether the United States has moved beyond equality.22 Yet discrimination has

19. See Iris Marion Young, Polity and Group Difference: A Critique of the Ideal of
Universal Citizenship, 99 ETHICS 250, 267 (1989) (maintaining that “rights and rules that are
universally formulated and thus blind to differences of race, culture, gender, age, or
disability, perpetuate rather than undermine oppression”).
20. See infra note 378–80 and accompanying text.
21. Courtney E. Martin, Transcending 9 to 5: How American Women and Men Are
Reworking Our Country, in THE SHRIVER REPORT: A WOMAN’S NATION CHANGES
EVERYTHING 383, 387 (Heather Boushey & Ann O’Leary eds., 2009), available at
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2009/10/pdf/awn/a_womans_nation.pdf [herinafter
THE SHRIVER REPORT].
22. See ANNE E. KORNBLUT, NOTES FROM THE CRACKED CEILING: HILLARY CLINTON,
SARAH PALIN, AND WHAT IT WILL TAKE FOR A WOMAN TO WIN 82 (2009) (describing
“postfeminist[]” voters); Sumi Cho, Post-Racialism, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1589, 1599 (2009)
(arguing that an Obama-era ideology of “post-racialism . . . [does] the ideological work of
colorblindness without so much of its retro-regressive baggage”); john a. powell, PostRacialism or Targeted Universalism?, 86 DENV. U. L. REV. 785, 789 (2009) (“To postracialists, white Americans’ support of President Obama is proof positive that we are in, or
rapidly approaching, a new, post-racial era.”).
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not disappeared;23 rather, it has morphed into new forms including implicit bias,24
institutional patterns of exclusion,25 and subtle demands to conform.26
Another problem is dilution: universalized rules may dilute civil rights
protections by reducing the resources available to protect those most
disadvantaged. The result of gender-neutral universalism may not be a norm that
works for everyone. Rather, universal policies risk diluting protections by failing to
go far enough to level the playing field for disadvantaged groups. Additionally, a
universal turn in harassment law and leave policy risks trivializing the harms of
discrimination. Due to scarce resources, if employers must expand their harassment
and leave policies to address a broader array of circumstances, they may be less
able to implement and enforce generous protections.
As a general theoretical matter, those concerned about discrimination should
approach the universal turn with caution. The problems of workplace inequality
cannot be resolved in a few broad strokes without attention to hierarchies built on
axes of identity. Prohibited bases for discrimination, like race, gender, and sexual
orientation, should be enumerated. Battles for political recognition must be fought,
and difficult economic choices must be made. I recommend that goals be reframed
in terms of increasing inclusiveness, rather than achieving absolute equality or
universality. Inclusiveness would require constant reconsideration of how legal
rules and workplace structures exclude certain workers. While this analysis is
developed in the context of workplace reform projects designed to reduce sex
discrimination, it is also pertinent to other debates over expanding the meaning of
civil rights rules.27

23. Female workers earn only seventy-seven cents per dollar earned by male workers.
Heather Boushey, The New Breadwinners, in THE SHRIVER REPORT, supra note 21, at 31, 32.
Even in the same occupations, women with substantially similar resumes and backgrounds
earn five percent less than men in the first year out of college. Id. at 59.
24. See, e.g., Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Implicit Bias, 94 CAL. L.
REV. 969, 982 (2006).
25. See, e.g., Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A
Structural Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458, 460−69 (2001) (contrasting “patterns of
interaction among groups within the workplace that, over time, exclude nondominant
groups” with “deliberate exclusion or subordination based on race or gender”).
26. See, e.g., Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Working Identity, 85 CORNELL L. REV.
1259, 1262 (2000) (arguing that members of outsider groups “are often likely to perceive
themselves as subject to negative stereotypes,” and therefore “likely to feel the need to do
significant amounts of ‘extra’ identity work to counter those stereotypes”); Kenji Yoshino,
Covering, 111 YALE L.J. 769 (2002) (discussing “covering” as a form of discrimination
resulting from explicit or implicit pressure to downplay identity).
27. For other debates over universal solutions to problems of inequality, see, for
example, Janie A. Chuang, Rescuing Trafficking from Ideological Capture: Prostitution
Reform and Anti-Trafficking Law and Policy, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1655, 1694−99 (2010)
(critiquing the focus on “sex trafficking” rather than “human trafficking”); Julie C. Suk,
Discrimination at Will: Job Security Protections and Equal Employment Opportunity in
Conflict, 60 STAN. L. REV. 73 (2007) (arguing that a universal rule only allowing
terminations of employees “for cause” would not protect minorities better than
antidiscrimination law).
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This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I sketches out the case for expansion of
sexual harassment law and leave policy. Part II identifies and describes the
“universal turn” in antidiscrimination theory and proposes a set of questions for
assessing universalizing policy initiatives from an antidiscrimination perspective.
Part III addresses these questions by analyzing reform projects aimed at taking the
“sexual” out of harassment law and the “family” out of leave policy, drawing on
social science and comparative legal research. It concludes that without attention to
gender, universal proposals are likely to result in increased inequality. Part IV
concludes that reformers should focus on the more modest goal of increasing
inclusiveness, rather than universalism, and suggests ways that law can move
beyond gender while still maintaining attention to gender discrimination. Rather
than addressing universal harms with civil rights laws, this Part suggests more
flexible and cautious approaches to resolving universal problems.
I. BEYOND SEX, GENDER, AND FAMILY
This Part summarizes the criticisms of the targeted approach to harassment law
and leave policy. It explains the limitations of sexual harassment and family leave
doctrines that have led to calls for universalized protections in the forms of antibullying laws and work-life accommodations.
A. Expanding Sexual Harassment
1. Extending Sexual Harassment Law from Women to Men
In the 1970s, feminist lawyers and activists such as Catharine MacKinnon
popularized the concept of sexual harassment, arguing successfully that it was a
form of discrimination “because of . . . sex” under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964.28 MacKinnon theorized that sexual harassment is the convergence of
“men’s control over women’s sexuality and capital’s control over employees’ work
lives.”29 But in the first federal appellate case to recognize sexual harassment as a
form of discrimination, the D.C. Circuit held that the doctrine applied to “a male
subordinate” harassed “by a heterosexual female superior,” or “a subordinate of
either gender” harassed “by a homosexual superior of the same gender.”30 In the
1998 decision, Oncale v. Sundowner, the Supreme Court held that harassment by
an aggressor of the same gender as the plaintiff would violate Title VII “if there
were credible evidence that the harasser was homosexual.”31

28. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006) (creating a cause of action for discrimination
“because of . . . race, color, religion, sex, or national origin”).
29. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A CASE OF
SEX DISCRIMINATION 174−75 (1979).
30. Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 990 n.55 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
31. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998). The Court also
held that a plaintiff could prove harassment by showing that the harasser was motivated by
general hostility to the presence of one gender in the workplace, or with evidence about how
the harasser treated members of the other sex. Id. at 80–81.
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2. Problems with Sexual Harassment Law
Even in its new gender-neutral form, sexual harassment law has been criticized as
too narrowly focused on sex. First, the doctrine fails to cover many types of
harassment claims. Second, because most sexual harassment plaintiffs are women,
women are stigmatized as potential plaintiffs, and they may face discrimination in
hiring and job opportunities as a result of employers’ fears that they may bring costly
suits. Third, the doctrine has shifted away from preventing gender discrimination and
toward preventing any expression of sexuality in the workplace.
a. Underinclusivity
Sexual harassment law is substantially limited in its ability to target harassment at
work and gender inequality. Feminists argue that sexual harassment law is
underinclusive as a result of the legal fixation with formal equality, or avoiding any
classifications based on sex. For example, the following fact patterns have sometimes
evaded the “because of . . . sex” requirement of Title VII32:
The Equal Opportunity or Bisexual Harasser. Some courts have held that a
harasser who uses sexual conduct to demean both men and women is not engaged in
discrimination.33 If, for example, a harasser touches both men and women in offensive
ways, but the men are subjected to worse treatment, that is, the harasser touches men’s
genitals but not women’s, the men would have a cause of action, while the women
might not.34
“Real Men.” Where men harass other men for failing to meet masculine gender
norms, some courts have held that the harassment is not “because of sex” but rather
“because of sexual orientation”—a category not covered under Title VII.35 The same

32. These examples are elaborations on those described in Ann McGinley’s helpful study.
See Ann C. McGinley, Creating Masculine Identities: Bullying and Harassment “Because of
Sex,” 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 1151, 1154−58 (2008).
33. Id. at 1155−56; Ronald Turner, Title VII and the Inequality-Enhancing Effects of the
Bisexual and Equal Opportunity Harasser Defenses, 7 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 341 (2005); see
also Holman v. Indiana, 211 F.3d 399, 402−04 (7th Cir. 2000) (“[B]ecause Title VII is premised
on eliminating discrimination, inappropriate conduct that is inflicted on both sexes, or is inflicted
regardless of sex, is outside the statute’s ambit.” (emphasis in original)). But see Steiner v.
Showboat Operating Co., 25 F.3d 1459, 1464 (9th Cir. 1994) (rejecting the equal opportunity
harasser argument in dicta).
34. Cf. Breitenfeldt v. Long Prairie Packing Co., 48 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1176 (D. Minn.
1999) (concluding that a man who was subjected to sexual assault was harassed because of sex,
by contrast to women who suffered “inappropriate touching” in a less offensive degree). But see
Suzanne B. Goldberg, Discrimination by Comparison, 120 YALE L.J. 728 (2011) (describing
harassment cases that examine the totality of the circumstances to determine whether harassment
was discriminatory).
35. McGinley, supra note 32, at 1156−57; see also, e.g., Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453
F.3d 757, 763−65 (6th Cir. 2006). But see Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256 F.3d 864
(9th Cir. 2001) (holding that harassment for failure to conform to a male stereotype is
discrimination “because of sex”); Schmedding v. Tnemec Co., 187 F.3d 862 (8th Cir. 1999)
(similar). Over the years, there have been several attempts to plug the gaps in the statute by
adding orientation and gender identity to Title VII as prohibited bases for discrimination. See Jill
D. Weinberg, Gender Nonconformity: An Analysis of Perceived Sexual Orientation and Gender
Identity Protection Under the Employment Non-Discrimination Act, 44 U.S.F. L. REV. 1, 8−13
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goes for transsexual identity.36
Hazing and Horseplay. Where men haze male newcomers or engage in
“horseplay” with established male workers, courts conclude it is not discrimination
because the harassers are not motivated by homosexual desire or anti-male
animosity.37
Gatekeeping. Where men harass women “to maintain work—particularly the
more highly rewarded lines of work—as bastions of masculine competence and
authority,”38 but not out of sexual desire or in a sexual manner, plaintiffs typically
lose.39 For example, women subjected to unfavorable treatment due to sexist
attitudes about their inferiority may not prevail on sexual harassment claims if they
were not subjected to sexualized conduct.40 As a general matter, it is difficult to
prove that harassment without sexual advances was “because of sex.”41
b. Stigmatizing Women as Victims
A second criticism is that sexual harassment law may have perverse economic
effects that hinder women’s workplace equality. This results from the fact that
women are the primary plaintiffs in sexual harassment suits. Despite the doctrinal
expansion, in 2008 men only filed approximately 16 percent of sexual harassment
charges.42 Because women are more likely to bring suit, sexual harassment law
could create disincentives for firms to hire women.43 Hiring discrimination cases

(2009) (providing a history).
36. Compare Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1084−85 (7th Cir. 1984)
(concluding that Title VII only makes it unlawful to “discriminate against women because they
are women and against men because they are men,” not transsexuals because they are
transsexuals), with Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 575 (6th Cir. 2004) (“Sex stereotyping
based on a person’s gender non-conforming behavior is impermissible discrimination,
irrespective of the cause of that behavior; a label, such as ‘transsexual,’ is not fatal to a sex
discrimination claim where the victim has suffered discrimination because of his or her gender
non-conformity.”).
37. See, e.g., Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Harbert-Yeargin, Inc., 266 F.3d 498,
519−23 (6th Cir. 2001).
38. Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 YALE L.J. 1683, 1687
(1998).
39. Clare Diefenbach, Same-Sex Sexual Harassment After Oncale: Meeting the
“Because of . . . Sex” Requirement, 22 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 42, 74, 94−96 (2007)
(surveying post-Oncale cases between 1998 and 2006).
40. See, e.g., Schultz, supra note 38, at 1734−35 (discussing Ramsey v. City of Denver,
907 F.2d 1004 (10th Cir. 1990)).
41. Id. at 1686−87.
42. Sexual Harassment Charges: EEOC & FEPAs Combined: FY 1997–FY 2010, U.S.
EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/
sexual_harassment.cfm.
43. See Jessica Fink, Unintended Consequences: How Antidiscrimination Litigation
Increases Group Bias in Employer-Defendants, 38 N.M. L. REV. 333, 345 (2008); Paul Oyer
& Scott Schaefer, Sorting, Quotas, and the Civil Rights Act of 1991: Who Hires When It’s
Hard to Fire?, 45 J.L. & ECON. 41, 46 (2002); Suk, supra note 27, at 83−84. See generally
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LAWS (1992).
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are very difficult to prove.44 And paradoxically, sexual harassment law may
discourage gender integration. In law firms, for example, some men in positions of
authority are resistant to mentoring women, or choosing them for privileged work
that requires closed-door meetings, late-night hours, or travel, for fear of
accusations of sexual harassment.45
c. Fixation with Sex
A third problem is that “sexual” harassment law has been interpreted as barring
sexual expression (rather than discriminatory harassment), leading to punishment
of even benign expressions of sexual desire and suppression of unconventional
sexuality. Based on her study of employer policies, Vicki Schultz has concluded
that employers have translated sexual harassment doctrine into overly prohibitive
policies, creating a desexualized, sanitized, and dehumanized workplace.46 In a
similar vein, Janet Halley has argued that Oncale has the potential to turn Title VII
into a tool of homophobic panic.47 She fears that Title VII could be used by
purported “victims” of benign, but unwanted, same-sex sexual overtures in the
workplace to oppress gay men or lesbians.48
3. Universal Protection Through Anti-Bullying Law
To address these problems, the grounds for a harassment claim have been
gradually expanding beyond sex, race, color, religion, or national origin.49 Every
new prohibited basis for discrimination is also a prohibited basis for harassment.
Federal laws prohibit discrimination based on pregnancy,50 genetic information,51

44. See Christine Jolls, Accommodation Mandates, 53 STAN. L. REV. 223, 275 (2000).
45. HOLLY ENGLISH, GENDER ON TRIAL: SEXUAL STEREOTYPES AND WORK/LIFE
BALANCE IN THE LEGAL WORKPLACE 65−70 (2003); see also Sari Bashi & Maryana Iskander,
Why Legal Education Is Failing Women, 18 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 389 (2006).
46. Schultz, supra note 6, at 2131 (describing an “avalanche of no-dating policies and love
contracts, zero-tolerance policies, self-policing, and discipline for conduct with sexual overtones”).
47. Janet Halley, Sexuality Harassment, in DIRECTIONS IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW
182, 195 (Catharine A. MacKinnon & Reva B. Siegel eds., 2004).
48. Janet Halley, Sexuality Harassment, in LEFT LEGALISM / LEFT CRITIQUE 80, 80–81
(Wendy Brown & Janet Halley eds., 2002). Marc Spindelman responds that Halley cites no
reported decision evidencing that courts have indulged any such homophobic plaintiffs.
Marc Spindelman, Discriminating Pleasures, in DIRECTIONS IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW
201, 204 (Catherine A. MacKinnon & Reva B. Siegel eds., 2004). Although Halley’s fears
have yet to play out on the pages of the federal reporters, research supports the view that
same-sex sexual overtures toward men are more likely to be perceived as harassment than
opposite-sex overtures toward men. See Margaret S. Stockdale, Cynthia Gandolfo Berry,
Robert W. Schneider & Feng Cao, Perceptions of the Sexual Harassment of Men, 5
PSYCHOL. MEN & MASCULINITY 158, 165 (2004).
49. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006)
(enumerating sex, race, color, religion, and national origin discrimination as grounds for a
Title VII claim).
50. Id. § 2000e(k).
51. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-233, 122 Stat.

1230

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 86:1219

age,52 disability,53 and union affiliation.54 Some state and local laws expand
prohibited bases for discrimination further, to appearance,55 sexual orientation,
gender identity, marital status, and victims of domestic violence,56 to name a few.57
Moreover, Title VII and other laws prohibit harassment in retaliation against an
employee for claiming discrimination—a cause of action valid regardless of
whether the plaintiff prevails on the underlying claim.58 The elements of these
harassment causes of action generally track those of a sexual harassment claim.
This patchwork of harassment prohibitions is gradually expanding toward a general
harassment ban that would take the “sexual” out of harassment law. The creeping
expansion of sexual harassment doctrine is accompanied by a shifting
understanding of the primary problem with harassment. The harm of harassment is
increasingly understood to be its affront to a worker’s dignity or health, not
necessarily that harassment contributes to inequality.
However, Title VII provides no remedy for abusive working conditions, no
matter how extreme, where the abuse is not discriminatory. Not only is there no
“general civility code”59 for the American workplace, but there is no cause of
action whatsoever for most workers who are subjected to nondiscriminatory
abuse.60 As a result, many scholars now call for universal protections against
harassment.61 These scholars are divided on whether new statutory remedies or
labor law and traditional tort remedies, such as the cause of action for intentional

881 (codified in scattered sections of 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C.).
52. 29 U.S.C. § 621 (2006).
53. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1)–(4) (2006).
54. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (2006).
55. See Deborah L. Rhode, The Injustice of Appearance, 61 STAN. L. REV. 1033,
1081−90 (2009).
56. See, e.g., Human Rights Law, N.Y. EXEC. LAW §§ 290–301 (McKinney 2005).
57. Many corporations prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation, gender
identity, or gender expression. See HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN FOUND., CORPORATE
EQUALITY INDEX 2010: A REPORT CARD ON LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL AND TRANSGENDER
EQUALITY IN CORPORATE AMERICA 8, 10−11 (2009), available at
http://www.hrc.org/documents/HRC_Corporate_Equality_Index_2010.pdf.
58. See, e.g., Rhonda Reaves, Retaliatory Harassment: Sex and the Hostile Coworker as
the Enforcer of Workplace Norms, 2007 MICH. ST. L. REV. 403, 417–20.
59. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998).
60. See Martha Chamallas, Discrimination and Outrage: The Migration from Civil
Rights to Tort Law, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2115, 2127−39 (2007) (concluding that the
majority of jurisdictions hold that hostile work environments are not sufficiently
“outrageous” to qualify as intentional infliction of emotional distress); David C. Yamada,
Crafting a Legislative Response to Workplace Bullying, 8 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 475,
496–97 (2004) [hereinafter Yamada, Crafting] (explaining that only a small number of
employers have written prohibitions on bullying that could possibly create a contractual
obligation); David C. Yamada, The Phenomenon of “Workplace Bullying” and the Need for
Status-Blind Hostile Work Environment Protection, 88 GEO. L.J. 475, 521−22 (2000)
[hereinafter Yamada, Phenomenon] (concluding that the regulatory framework established
by the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 to avoid “serious physical harm” to
workers is too focused on physical workplace hazards to address harassment).
61. See supra note 8.
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infliction of emotional distress,62 can provide redress to victims or change
prevailing norms.63
The U.S. approach of prohibiting only discriminatory workplace harassment
stands in contrast to the universal approach of many other countries.64 Around the
same time that MacKinnon popularized the concept of sexual harassment in the
United States in the 1980s, German psychologist Dr. Heinz Leymann popularized
the concept of workplace bullying as a political issue in Europe.65 Leymann
described the phenomenon as “mobbing” or “psychological terror,”66 and he
studied post-traumatic stress disorder in victims.67 A substantial body of empirical
research now documents the effects of workplace bullying, which include harms to
the physical, psychological, and economic well-being of workers and increased
costs for employers.68 A number of European countries specifically regulate
workplace bullying, including Austria, Belgium, Denmark, England, Finland,
France, the Netherlands, and Sweden.69 Closer to home, Quebec’s labour code was
amended in 2004 to ban “psychological harassment,” defined as “vexatious
behaviour in the form of repeated and hostile or unwanted conduct . . . that affects

62. See Raess v. Doescher, 883 N.E.2d 790, 799 (Ind. 2008) (commenting that
workplace bullying could be a form of intentional infliction of emotional distress).
63. Compare Yamada, Crafting, supra note 60 (advocating legislative solutions), and
Harthill, supra note 8, at 1305–06 (advocating regulatory measures), with Ehrenreich, supra
note 8, at 22 (advocating common law remedies), and Corbett, supra note 8 (same).
64. See Gabrielle S. Friedman & James Q. Whitman, The European Transformation of
Harassment Law: Discrimination Versus Dignity, 9 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 241 (2003).
65. Heinz Leymann, Some Historical Notes: Research and the Term Mobbing, THE
MOBBING ENCYCLOPAEDIA, http://www.leymann.se/English/11120E.HTM.
66. Id.
67. Heinz Leymann, How Serious Are Psychological Problems After Mobbing?, THE
MOBBING ENCYCLOPAEDIA, http://www.leymann.se/English/32100E.HTM.
68. See Susan Harthill, Bullying in the Workplace: Lessons from the United Kingdom,
17 MINN. J. INT’L L. 247, 258–60 (2008); Loraleigh Keashly & Joel H. Neuman, Bullying in
the Workplace: Its Impact and Management, 8 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 335 (2004). The
phenomenon has also spawned a cottage industry of popular nonfiction books. See
Workplace
Bullying
Institute,
Workplace
Bullying-Related
Books,
http://www.workplacebullying.org/research/suggestedWORKPLACEBULLYING.ORG,
readings.html (collecting twenty titles on the topic). Lest you think it not serious, the
research shows that bullying by pilots has caused fatal plane crashes. E.g., Carl H. Lavin,
When Moods Affect Safety: Communication in a Cockpit Means a Lot a Few Miles Up, N.Y.
TIMES, June 26, 1994, at E18 (describing two plane crashes resulting after bullied crew
members became fearful and failed to challenge pilots’ decisions). Bullying by doctors has
resulted in patient deaths. E.g., Lisa Rosetta, Abuse Protection Sought for Health Care
Workers, SALT LAKE TRIB., Oct. 21, 2009 (describing a case in which nurses failed to follow
up on a mother’s complaints that her toddler was dehydrated because they were afraid of
retribution from a bullying doctor who had told them the toddler was fine, leading to the
child’s death).
69. For a summary, see Frank Lorho & Ulrich Hilp, Bullying at Work 15–23 (European
Parliament Directorate-Gen. for Research, Working Paper SOCI 108 EN, 2001), available at
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/workingpapers/soci/pdf/108_en.pdf.
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an employee’s dignity or psychological or physical integrity and that results in a
harmful work environment for the employee.”70
In the United States, anti-bullying bills have been introduced in twenty state
legislatures, including New York and California.71 All of the statutory proposals are
based on model anti-bullying legislation termed the “Healthy Workplace Act.”72
The model act defines actionable conduct more narrowly than other countries’
statutes, as “conduct that a reasonable person would find hostile, offensive, and
unrelated to an employer’s legitimate business interests.”73 It specifies that
“severity, nature, and frequency” are relevant to determining whether conduct is
abusive.74 A cause of action would look much like a harassment case under Title
VII, minus the discrimination, and plus the mental state of “malice.”75
Although the law on the books prohibits only status-based harassment, in
practice, U.S. employers have begun implementing broader harassment bans in the
workplace. Even without formal legislation, the global trend toward anti-bullying
rules has affected the conduct of U.S. employers.76 Global employers, faced with
different rules in different jurisdictions, have incentives to adopt the most
restrictive rules and enforce anti-bullying policies at U.S. as well as European
worksites.77 Some U.S. companies have already added bullying to the list of
prohibited practices, along with status-based harassment.78 Unions have begun to

70. Act Respecting Labour Standards, R.S.Q. 2002, c. N-1.1, ch. IV, div. V.2, § 81.18
¶ 1 (Que., Can.), http://www.canlii.org/en/qc/laws/stat/rsq-c-n-1.1/84271/rsq-c-n-1.1.
html#history. Saskatchewan amended its Occupational Health and Safety Act to bar
psychological harassment in 2007. Occupational Health and Safety (Harassment Prevention)
Amendment Act of 2007, S.S. 66 (Can.).
71. See The Healthy Workplace Campaign, HEALTHY WORKPLACE BILL (Feb. 28, 2011),
http://www.healthyworkplacebill.org/states.php.
72. Id. The New York and California bills follow the Healthy Workplace Act in
pertinent part.
73. Yamada, Crafting, supra note 60, at 517–21.
74. Id. at 518.
75. Id. at 518–20.
76. The Federal Bureau of Investigation advises employers to adopt workplace violence
prevention programs that consider “[h]omicide and other physical assaults . . . on a continuum that
also include[s] domestic violence, stalking, threats, harassment, bullying, emotional abuse,
intimidation, and other forms of conduct that create anxiety, fear, and a climate of distrust in the
workplace.” FBI NAT’L CTR. FOR THE ANALYSIS OF VIOLENT CRIME, WORKPLACE VIOLENCE: ISSUES
IN RESPONSE 13 (Eugene A. Rugala & Arnold R. Isaacs eds., 2004).
77. Tresa Baldas, No Matter Where the Employees Are, Make Sure the Rules Are the
SAME, NAT’L L.J., Jan. 7, 2010, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/cc/PubArticleCC.jsp
?id=1202437433481&No_Matter_Where_the_Employees_Are_Make_Sure_the_Rules_Are
_the_emSAMEem.
78. See NOA DAVENPORT, RUTH DISTLER SCHWARTZ & GAIL PURSELL ELLIOTT,
MOBBING: EMOTIONAL ABUSE IN THE AMERICAN WORKPLACE 148–53 (3d prtg. 2005)
(describing anti-mobbing policies at Levi Strauss & Co. and Saturn Corp.); Cari Tuna,
Lawyers and Employers Take the Fight to “Workplace Bullies,” WALL ST. J., Aug. 4, 2008,
at B6 (reporting that in June 2008, Graniterock, a Watsonville, California distributor of
construction materials, “added nondiscriminatory bullying to its list of prohibited conduct in
the workplace, which already included harassment based on gender, ethnicity and other
protected statuses”); STATE OF OR. DEP’T OF ENVTL. QUALITY, ANTI-MOBBING POLICY, NO.
50.110 (Feb. 12, 2001), available at http://www.deq.state.or.us/msd/budget/0709GRB/
13_SpecialReports/AffirmativeActionPlan2005-07.pdf.
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add protections against workplace bullying to collective bargaining agreements.79
B. Expanding Family Leave
1. Extending Leave Policy from Mothers to Parents
Just as sexual harassment doctrine began as a means to eradicate women’s
workplace subordination, feminists argued for maternity leave as a remedy for
women’s exclusion from the workplace.80 By 1991, fifteen states were providing
women up to one year of extended maternity leave, while only four provided men
with the same.81 In 1993, Congress passed the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA),
allowing both men and women to take job-protected, unpaid leave for childbirth or
adoption, or for an employee’s “serious health condition,” or that of the employee’s
spouse, parents, or children.82 Parents include “those with day-to-day
responsibilities to care for and financially support a child.”83 In 2003, in Nevada
Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs, the Supreme Court affirmed that the
FMLA was a valid exercise of Congress’s power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment, as a remedy for the states’ “differential leave policies” for men and
women.84 Those differential leave policies violated the equal protection clause
because they “were not attributable to any differential physical needs of men and
women, but rather to the pervasive sex-role stereotype that caring for family
members is women’s work.”85 Thus, the Court affirmed Congress’s requirement
that leave policy be formally gender neutral.
2. Problems with Family Leave Policy
Even in its new gender-neutral form, family leave policy, like sexual harassment
law, has been criticized as misdirected. First, the statute is under-inclusive: it gives
no help to most workers. Second, because most leave takers are women, women are
stigmatized as less-able workers, resulting in discrimination. Third, the doctrine has
shifted away from helping women achieve parity in labor markets and toward
protecting traditional families.
a. Underinclusivity
The FMLA is limited in its ability to address inflexible work and gender
inequality. Its coverage has the following shortcomings:

79. See Yamada, supra note 8, at 271.
80. See Linda J. Krieger & Patricia N. Cooney, The Miller-Wohl Controversy: Equal
Treatment, Positive Action and the Meaning of Women’s Equality, 13 GOLDEN GATE U. L.
REV. 513, 522 (1983).
81. Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 731 (2003).
82. See 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1) (2006).
83. 29 C.F.R. § 825.122(c)(3) (2009).
84. 538 U.S. at 726–27, 731.
85. Id. at 731.
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Low-Income Workers. Because of the statute’s limitations on worker eligibility,
forty-six percent of the workforce is not protected by the FMLA.86 Even for
covered workers, the FMLA stops short of ensuring paid leave.87 The result: lowincome workers are unlikely to be protected.88
Single Parents. Although only half of U.S. households conform to the traditional
married-couple model,89 unpaid leave is of little use to employees without a
breadwinning partner to provide support during the period of leave.90 This places
African American and Latino/a families, which are more likely to have a single
parent, and women, who are more likely to head single-parent families, at a
disproportionate disadvantage.91
Routine Caregiving. Many of the potential caregiving responsibilities that may
interfere with work fall short of a “serious health condition.”92 For example, if a
daycare shut down because some children were sick, only the parents of the sick
children would be covered by the FMLA, while the parents of the children
unaffected by the outbreak would be without daycare but uncovered.93 The FMLA
does not help parents who need time to participate meaningfully in their children’s
lives when they are healthy. Proposed legislation would give parents time off for
school activities, like parent-teacher conferences.94

86. Family and Medical Leave Act Regulations: A Report on the Department of Labor’s
Request for Information, 72 Fed. Reg. 35550, 35622 (Dep’t of Labor June 28, 2007). The
FMLA applies only to workplaces with fifty or more employees. 29 U.S.C. § 2611(4)(A)(i).
The employee must have been on the job for at least a year and have worked at least 1250
hours during the year before the leave. Id. § 2611(2)(A).
87. California, Washington, New Jersey, San Francisco, and Washington, D.C. now
mandate some form of paid leave, whether financed by employers or through payroll taxes
on all workers. Feldblum, supra note 9, at 257–59.
88. See Naomi Cahn & June Carbone, Lifting the Floor: Sex, Class, and Education, 39
U. BALT. L.F. 57, 62 (2009); Ann O’Leary, How Family Leave Laws Left Out Low-Income
Workers, 28 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1 (2007); Michael Selmi & Naomi Cahn, Women
in the Workplace: Which Women, Which Agenda?, 13 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 7, 16
(2006).
89. JASON FIELDS & LYNNE M. CASPER, AMERICA’S FAMILIES AND LIVING
ARRANGEMENTS: 2000, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU REP. P20-537, at 3 fig.1 (2001), available at
http://www.census.gov/prod/2001pubs/p20-537.pdf (showing that as of the year 2000,
47.2% of households were not married couples).
90. See Wen-Jui Han, Christopher Ruhm & Jane Waldfogel, Parental Leave Policies
and Parents’ Employment and Leave-Taking, 28 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 29, 50 (2009)
(finding “evidence of stronger effects [of leave legislation] for married than single mothers,
as expected, because married women are more likely to be eligible under the laws and able
to afford a period of unpaid leave”).
91. See Nancy E. Dowd, Race, Gender, and Work/Family Policy, 15 WASH. U. J.L. &
POL’Y 219, 245 (2004).
92. Katharine B. Silbaugh, Is the Work-Family Conflict Pathological or Normal Under
the FMLA? The Potential of the FMLA to Cover Ordinary Work-Family Conflicts, 15 WASH.
U. J.L. & POL’Y 193, 196 (2004) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 2611(11) (2000)).
93. Id. at 216.
94. Family and Medical Leave Enhancement Act of 2009, H.R. 824, 111th Cong.
(2009).
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Nonparent and Nonspouse Caregivers. “While the FMLA is quite liberal in
defining the parent/child relationship, its view of caregiving is crabbed and
unrealistically focused on parenthood as the locus of caregiving.”95 The FMLA
provides for leave to care for spouses but not domestic partners.96 Siblings and
other relatives are not covered. Although many communities are built on ties
outside kinship,97 an employee who wishes to take leave to care for a sick friend or
relative who is not a parent, spouse, or child cannot do so under the FMLA.98
b. Stigmatizing Women as Less-Able Workers
A second problem is that because women are the primary beneficiaries of family
leave policy, they are stigmatized as less-able workers. Although the FMLA is
gender neutral, women are more likely than men to take leave.99 As a result,
employers may engage in hiring discrimination against women.100 Some scholars
have concluded that the FMLA has exacerbated discrimination against women, to
the extent it has had any effect at all.101 Women, but not men, are penalized in labor

95. Melissa Murray, The Networked Family: Reframing the Legal Understanding of
Caregiving and Caregivers, 94 VA. L. REV. 385, 408 (2008).
96. See Kimberly Menashe Glassman, Balancing the Demands of the Workplace with
the Needs of the Modern Family: Expanding Family and Medical Leave to Protect Domestic
Partners, 37 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 837 (2004); Laura T. Kessler, Transgressive Caregiving,
33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1 (2005).
97. Dorothy E. Roberts, The Genetic Tie, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 209, 269 (1995) (“Blood
ties have not held the preeminent position in Black families that they have held in white
families.”).
98. See Ethan J. Leib, Friendship and the Law, 54 UCLA L. REV. 631, 697 (2007);
Murray, supra note 95, at 408 (“The Act is oblivious to caregivers who provide care, but
otherwise do not cohere with normative understandings of parenthood.”); Laura A.
Rosenbury, Friends with Benefits?, 106 MICH. L. REV. 189, 204 (2007); see also Rachel F.
Moran, How Second-Wave Feminism Forgot the Single Woman, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 223,
288–92 (2004). But see Dep’t of Labor, Administrator’s Interpretation No. 2010-3 (June 22,
2010) (defining “son or daughter” under section 101(12) of the FMLA to give rights to those
who care for children regardless of the legal or biological relationship).
99. See U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR WAGE & HOUR DIV., THE 2000 SURVEY REPORT app. A-2,
tbls.A2-2.4, 2.6 (2001), http://www.dol.gov/whd/fmla/APPX-A-2-TABLES.htm.
100. Michael Selmi, Family Leave and the Gender Wage Gap, 78 N.C. L. REV. 707, 745–
50 (2000); see also Martin H. Malin, Fathers and Parental Leave Revisited, 19 N. ILL. U. L.
REV. 25, 32 (1998) (“As long as parental leave is de facto maternity leave there
will be wide spread, but often difficult to prove, discrimination against women in the
workplace.”).
101. See Jean Kimmel & Catalina Amuedo-Dorantes, The Effects of Family Leave on
Wages, Employment, and the Family Wage Gap: Distributional Implications, 15 WASH. U.
J.L. & POL’Y 115, 139 (2004) (finding “a strong negative effect of mandated family leave on
employment, implying that gender discrimination has resulted from a federally mandated
benefit that employers fear will increase costs”); Michael Selmi, Is Something Better Than
Nothing? Critical Reflections on Ten Years of the FMLA, 15 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 65, 71
(2004). But see Catherine Albiston, Institutional Perspectives on Law, Work, and Family, 3
ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 397, 404 & n.2 (2007) (concluding that empirical research
suggests unpaid leave legislation had little to no negative effect on women’s wages as a
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markets for being parents.102 Courts are beginning to recognize family
responsibilities discrimination as a civil rights violation.103 However, courts have
not gone so far as to hold that employers must accommodate employees’ family
responsibilities.
c. Fixation with Family
A third problem is that leave policy is too focused on the family to the exclusion
of other valuable life pursuits.104 Katherine Franke extends the feminist critique of
compulsory heterosexuality to critique compulsory motherhood, which she terms
“repronormativity.”105 Franke questions the claim that mothering “is social
production worthy of substantial public support,” by pointing out that biological
reproduction “is by no means the only manner in which social reproduction takes
place, nor is it necessarily the most important.”106 Mary Ann Case gives the
example: “what if a poor woman wants to write a book or start a business or get an

whole, although individual workers who take leave are penalized).
102. See, e.g., ANN CRITTENDEN, THE PRICE OF MOTHERHOOD: WHY THE MOST
IMPORTANT JOB IN THE WORLD IS STILL THE LEAST VALUED (2001); Michelle J. Budig &
Paula England, The Wage Penalty for Motherhood, 66 AM. SOC. REV. 204 (2001); Jane
Waldfogel, The Effect of Children on Women’s Wages, 62 AM. SOC. REV. 209 (1997); Jane
Waldfogel, Understanding the “Family Gap” in Pay for Women with Children, 12 J. ECON.
PERSP. 137 (1998); see also Shelley J. Correll, Stephen Benard & In Paik, Getting a Job: Is
There a Motherhood Penalty?, 112 AM. J. SOC. 1297, 1332 (2007) (discussing how, in two
experiments, one in which undergraduates evaluated fictitious job applications varying in
gender and parental status, and one in which employers were sent resumes for fictitious job
candidates varying only in gender and parental status, mothers were disadvantaged compared
to women without children, while fathers were advantaged over men without children).
103. See Chadwick v. Wellpoint, Inc., 561 F.3d 38 (1st Cir. 2009); Back v. Hastings on
Hudson Union Free Sch. Dist., 365 F.3d 107 (2d Cir. 2004). The Center for Work Life Law
at UC Hastings Law School has documented a four hundred percent increase in the number
of cases brought under the rubric of family responsibilities discrimination in recent decades.
MARY C. STILL, LITIGATING THE MATERNAL WALL: U.S. LAWSUITS CHARGING
DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WORKERS WITH FAMILY RESPONSIBILITIES 2 (July 6, 2006),
available at http://www.worklifelaw.org/pubs/FRDreport.pdf.
104. Kathleen Silbaugh has observed that in some recent FMLA cases, courts have given
the term “serious health condition” an expansive interpretation, allowing parents time off to
care for routine childhood illnesses. Silbaugh, supra note 92, at 204. Silbaugh suggests that
these cases show the judiciary has begun to internalize shifting cultural norms toward
recognition of ordinary work-family dilemmas and accommodation of workers’ caregiving
responsibilities. Id. at 214–15. She analogizes this trend to acceptance of sexual harassment
by a conservative judiciary eager to impose civility norms on the workplace by quashing
sexual expression. Id. Silbaugh concludes that “[w]hile a decency-based norm of family time
need not be as problematic as a decency based norm against sexual expression,” feminists
must remain vigilant to ensure that work-family policy is accompanied by a focus on
equality. Id. at 215.
105. Franke, supra note 9, at 183.
106. Id. at 188–89. Population replacement can be accomplished through immigration
policy. Id. at 192–95; Case, supra note 9, at 1773–74. Arguments to the contrary are often
tinged with racism or xenophobia. Franke, supra note 9, at 192–95.
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advanced degree instead of raising a(nother) child?”107 Policies that privilege the
family may be built on the assumption that the life pursuits of those who opt out of
traditional family arrangements are less important or meaningful.108
3. Universal Protection Through Work-Life Policy
To address these problems, family leave policy, like harassment law, has been
undergoing gradual expansion. In 2007, the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) issued an enforcement guidance on the topic of “caregiving
responsibilities” that observes that such responsibilities are not limited to childcare,
but also encompass eldercare and caring for individuals with disabilities.109 Nine
states and the District of Columbia have now expanded on the FMLA’s definition
of family to include nontraditional family members, such as domestic partners or
parents-in-law.110 In 2008, the FMLA was amended to allow “next of kin” to take
twenty-six weeks of leave during a twelve-month period to care for a wounded
military service member.111 Many states have laws requiring leave or giving
employers incentives to provide leave for organ, blood, or bone-marrow donors,
emergency or disaster volunteers, victims of crimes, victims of domestic violence,
witnesses in legal proceedings, those on jury duty, and voters.112 One handbook of
employee benefits lists the following types of leave: pregnancy, post-pregnancy,
family, sick, disability, personal, bereavement, weddings, jury duty, military
service, educational, government service, and sabbatical.113 These new forms of
leave expand coverage to more situations and move away from the focus on women
and family to a focus on workers’ liberty interests in structuring their work and
personal lives.

107. Case, supra note 9, at 1781.
108. See BELLA DE PAULO, SINGLED OUT: HOW SINGLES ARE STEREOTYPED,
STIGMATIZED, AND IGNORED, AND STILL LIVE HAPPILY EVER AFTER 255 (2006) (arguing that
single people “get last dibs on vacation time, travel options, and choice of assignments
because the obligations and interests that make their lives meaningful are deemed less
important than the outside-of-work commitments of married people”); see also ELINOR
BURKETT, THE BABY BOON: HOW FAMILY-FRIENDLY AMERICA CHEATS THE CHILDLESS
(2000) (similar).
109. EEOC, supra note 14.
110. State Family and Medical Leave Laws That Are More Expansive Than the Federal
FMLA, NAT’L P’SHIP FOR WOMEN & FAMILIES, http://www.nationalpartnership.org/site/
DocServer/StatesandunpaidFMLLaws.pdf?docID=968 [hereinafter NAT’L P’SHIP FOR
WOMEN & FAMILIES].
111. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(3) (2006 & Supp. III 2009). One scholar argues that these
reforms have laid the groundwork for future laws expanding the definition of family under
other provisions of the FMLA. Marcy Karin, Time Off for Military Families: An Emerging
Case Study in a Time of War . . . and the Tipping Point for Future Laws Supporting WorkLife Balance?, 33 RUTGERS L. REC. 46 (2009).
112. See NAT’L P’SHIP FOR WOMEN & FAMILIES, supra note 110.
113. 2 HR SERIES POLICIES AND PRACTICES § 109:18 (2010) (providing a checklist of
potential topics for an employee handbook); id. § 207:8 (discussing trends in paid leave,
such as sabbatical leave for mid- to upper-level executives).

1238

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 86:1219

As with anti-bullying legislation, the U.S. approach to work-life issues stands in
contrast to that of Europe.114 The United States and Australia are the only liberal
welfare states that do not mandate some form of paid leave.115 Statutes in Belgium,
France, Germany, and the Netherlands require flexible working rights for all
employees, while under U.K. law employees with childcare or caregiving
responsibilities have the right to request flexibility.116 The difference might be
explained by contrasting attitudes toward social entitlements,117 or by the fact that
the European policies were intended to stem declining fertility rates and labor
shortages, problems that are not on the radar in the United States.118 Whatever the
reason, the average European worker works three hundred fewer hours per year
than the average U.S. worker.119
Some scholars go beyond the equality focus to argue that in the ideal workplace,
“job-protected, paid leave would provide not only time off from work for familyrelated reasons, but also time away from the job for the pursuit of other life
endeavors such as education, rest, or rejuvenation that would make a worker more
productive.”120 Advocates refer to “manifold” reasons an employee might require
flexible work arrangements, from caring for an elderly parent, to attending a
weekly Bible session, to volunteer engagements.121 The EEOC has concluded that
employers should adopt best practices to allow “all workers,” regardless of sex, “to
balance work and personal responsibilities.”122

114. See Saul Levmore, Parental Leave and American Exceptionalism, 58 CASE W. RES.
L. REV. 203 (2007); Julie C. Suk, Are Gender Stereotypes Bad for Women? Rethinking
Antidiscrimination Law and Work-Family Conflict, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (2010).
115. See The World’s Women Reports, U.N. Doc. ST/ESA/STAT/SER.K/WWW/
16/Rev.5, UNITED NATIONS STATISTICS DIV. (Apr. 22, 2005), http://unstats.un.org/unsd/
demographic/products/indwm/ww2005/tab5c.htm. Lesotho, Papua New Guinea, and
Swaziland also do not provide paid leave. Id.
116. ARIANE HEGEWISCH, INST. FOR WOMEN’S POLICY RESEARCH, EQUALITY & HUMAN
RIGHTS COMM’N, FLEXIBLE WORKING POLICIES: A COMPARATIVE REVIEW, at iii (2009),
available
at
http://www.equalityhumanrights.com/uploaded_files/research/16_flexibleworking.pdf.
Australia also provides employees with children the right to request flexible work
arrangements. Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) ch 2 pt 2 div 4 (Austl.).
117. See Linda A. White, The United States in Comparative Perspective: Maternity and
Parental Leave and Child Care Benefits Trends in Liberal Welfare States, 21 YALE J.L. &
FEMINISM 185, 190–92 (2009).
118. See Levmore, supra note 114, at 207–10. Moreover, paid leave is less expensive in
countries with low fertility rates. Id. at 208.
119. Marcello Estevão & Filipa Sá, The 35-Hour Workweek in France: Straightjacket or
Welfare Improvement?, 23 ECON. POL’Y 417, 420 (2008).
120. Patricia A. Shiu & Stephanie M. Wildman, Pregnancy Discrimination and Social
Change: Evolving Consciousness About a Worker’s Right to Job-Protected, Paid Leave, 21
YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 119, 120–21 (2009); see also Case, supra note 9, at 1786 (“Just as for
the ancient Israelites the promised land flowed with milk and honey, so for modern feminists
it would offer all inhabitants, regardless of sex or of their need to give or receive care, the
time and resources and liberty to pursue their freely chosen life projects unconstrained.”).
121. Feldblum, supra note 9, at 270.
122. EEOC, supra note 14.
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In the mid-1990s, corporations and human-resources professionals moved from
the term “work-family” to the term “work-life.”123 A national survey of employers
found that many had adopted flexible work options such as part-time, job-sharing,
time off, compressed workweeks, employee control over work hours, and
telecommuting.124 Some state laws give certain employees the right to ask for such
arrangements.125 A few workplaces have abandoned the time clock altogether,
allowing each worker the discretion to decide when to work and measuring
performance based on whether deadlines are met and results achieved.126 Other
feminists propose a broad range of universal solutions, from shortened workweeks
to containing suburban sprawl.127 Whatever the specific policy, the norm has
shifted to universality: “[W]hile work-life policies historically were adopted with a
goal of breaking down barriers to the inclusion of women and those with caregiving
demands, the goals of work-life policies have now broadened to include a multitude
of nonwork identities.”128

123. Paulette R. Gerkovich, Work-Life Policy and Practice in the USA: Gendered
Premise, Radical Potential?, in WORK-LIFE BALANCE: A PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE 276,
279 (Fiona Jones, Ronald J. Burke & Mina Westman eds., 2006).
124. JAMES T. BOND, ELLEN GALINSKY, STACY S. KIM & ERIN BROWNFIELD, FAMILIES &
WORK INST., 2005 NATIONAL STUDY OF EMPLOYERS (2005), available at
http://familiesandwork.org/site/research/reports/2005nse.pdf; see also Arnow-Richman,
supra note 9, at 1095.
125. See HAW. REV. STAT. § 302A-610 (West 2008) (school employees may apply to job
share); MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-18-107 (2009) (job sharing); OR. REV. STAT. § 240.855 (2009)
(state agency employees may request telecommuting arrangements).
126. See Erin L. Kelly & Phyllis Moen, Rethinking the ClockWork of Work: Why
Schedule Control May Pay Off at Work and at Home, 9 ADVANCES IN DEVELOPING HUM.
RESOURCES 487 (2007); see also Michelle Conlin, Gap to Employees: Work Wherever,
Whenever
You
Want,
BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK,
Sept.
17,
2009,
http://www.businessweek.com/careers/managementiq/archives/2009/09/gap_to_employee.ht
ml (discussing initiatives at Best Buy and the Gap Outlet corporate headquarters).
127. See JERRY A. JACOBS & KATHLEEN GERSON, THE TIME DIVIDE: WORK, FAMILY, AND
GENDER INEQUALITY 182–85 (2004); Schultz, supra note 9, at 1942, 1947–48, 1956–57
(proposing restructuring of the labor market to shorten the workweek, democratize
workplaces, and subsidize a living wage); Schultz & Hoffman, supra note 12, at 133–34.
The range of policy options falling under the work-family label extends far beyond the
workplace. See, e.g., Selmi & Cahn, supra note 88, at 9 (advocating more state-funded
childcare in the form of lengthened school days and before- and afterschool programs);
Katharine B. Silbaugh, Women’s Place: Urban Planning, Housing Design, and Work-Family
Balance, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1797, 1800 (2007) (proposing containing suburban sprawl
and designing better houses to reduce commute and housework burdens).
128. Ann Marie Ryan & Ellen Ernst Kossek, Work-Life Policy Implementation: Breaking
Down or Creating Barriers to Inclusiveness?, 47 HUM. RESOURCE MGMT. 295, 298 (2008)
(internal citation omitted); see also Brad Harrington & Jamie J. Ladge, Work-Life
Integration: Present Dynamics and Future Directions for Organizations, 38 ORG. DYNAMICS
148, 148 (2009) (“Rooted in the history of women’s rights and equal opportunity in
education and the workplace, the notion of work-life has shifted in focus from solely a
woman’s concern to a workforce management issue.”). But see FRANK DOBBIN, INVENTING
EQUAL OPPORTUNITY 177 (2009) (arguing that tools of equal opportunity like flextime and
grievance procedures were in the “personnel arsenal” before the women’s movement arrived
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II. THE UNIVERSAL TURN IN ANTIDISCRIMINATION THEORY
The foregoing discussion suggests why universal protections are seen as the cures
to the ailments of sexual harassment law and family leave policy. These universal
protections are connected to a broader universalist paradigm for approaching
discrimination. In this Part, I describe this universal turn and discuss the purported
advantages of such a shift in terms of equality. I also identify potential disadvantages
for those concerned with antidiscrimination. I conclude that the purported advantages
and disadvantages of the universal turn are theoretical. By theoretical, I mean that it
cannot be assumed that any particular policy will result in these effects. Particular
policies must be analyzed in context to determine whether they would fulfill the
theoretical promise of universalist theory. Part III will take up such a contextual
inquiry with respect to anti-bullying rules and work-life accommodations.
A. Defining the Universal Turn
The universal frame is distinct from the two conventional paradigms for
understanding discrimination—anticlassification and antisubordination—both of
which rely on protected or prohibited identity categorizations like race or sex.129
The anticlassification principle prohibits rules that differentiate based on race or
other forbidden characteristics, while the antisubordination principle prohibits rules
that create or reinforce caste systems based on race or other group affiliations.130
By contrast, the new universalism endeavors to draw attention to problems once
seen as issues of inequality without recourse to identity categories.131 It does so by
(1) changing the axis of protection from identity traits to universal conditions like
vulnerability,132 (2) shifting focus from equal rights to universal rights like
liberty133 or dignity,134 or (3) moving away from condemnation of prejudice toward
banning disrespect135 or irrational decision making.136
on the scene). Although policies like flextime did not become strategies for women’s
equality until the 1980s, id. at 179, the conventional wisdom is that flexible work
arrangements were historically accommodations for women.
129. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, The American Civil Rights Tradition:
Anticlassification or Antisubordination?, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 9 (2003).
130. See id. at 9–10.
131. See supra note 12. For a discussion of universalism’s revival as a theoretical
position, see generally Linda M.G. Zerilli, This Universalism Which Is Not One, 28
DIACRITICS 3 (1998).
132. See Fineman, supra note 12, at 21.
133. See YOSHINO, supra note 12, at 190; Yoshino, supra note 12, at 792.
134. See Reva B. Siegel, Dignity and the Politics of Protection: Abortion Restrictions
Under Casey/Carhart, 117 YALE L.J. 1694, 1736–53 (2008). I note that Yoshino uses the
term “dignity” to refer to the synthesis of equality and liberty concerns. Yoshino, supra note
12, at 749. For purposes of this Article, I follow Whitman and Freidman in referring to
“dignity” as an independent concept that refers to “being shown deference and respect in
everyday interaction,” which may either coexist or be at odds with “equality,” defined as
freedom from discrimination on the basis of certain prejudices. See Friedman & Whitman,
supra note 64, at 264, 268–70.
135. See Fisk, supra note 8, at 94–95.
136. See YOSHINO, supra note 12, at 177.
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The following grid attempts to collect the terms associated with the
antisubordination, anticlassification, and universalist paradigms of discrimination:
FIGURE 1
THREE APPROACHES TO DISCRIMINATION

Value at
Stake
Paradigmatic
Policy
Role of
Reform
Goal of
Policy
Protected
Identity
Relevant
Unit
Harm of
Harassment
Harm of
Inflexible Work

Antisubordination

Anticlassification

Universalism

Social Equality

Civil Equality

Liberty /
Dignity

Redistribution

Antidifferentiation

Human Rights

Leveling

Neutrality

Expanding
Protection

Accommodation

Assimilation

Transformation

Difference

Sameness

Balance

Groups

Individuals

Humanity

Enforcement of
Gender Norms
Subordination of
Mothers

Sex-Based
Differentiation
Discrimination
Against Parents

Abusive
Environments
Work-Life
Conflicts

The point of this grid is simply to provide a provisional map of a changing
lexicon of associated ideas, not to imply any conceptual clarity, rigorous
distinctions, or chronological evolution. Indeed, many particular legal rules could
be characterized as fitting within two or three of these rubrics. Universalism does
not seem to be an independent third way, nor does it seem to be the synthesis of the
antisubordination and anticlassification positions. Nonetheless, it has the potential
to offer common ground for adherents of both the antisubordination and
anticlassification models.137 The model avoids identity categories, appealing to
those who oppose group-based protections, while promising universal structural
change that will improve conditions for everyone, appealing to those concerned
with subordination. But in practice, would this model be blind to identity
categories? Would it resolve subordination along with universal harms? It is
important to consider how legal rules framed in terms of the “new” category might
entail the benefits and drawbacks of the old ones.

137. Cf. Mario L. Barnes, Erwin Chemerinsky & Trina Jones, A Post-Race Equal
Protection?, 98 GEO. L.J. 967, 977–78 (2010) (describing the “cross-ideological appeal” of
post-racialism).
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B. Theoretical Advantages of the Universal Turn
The universal turn would have the advantage of providing coverage to groups
not always cognizable under equality jurisprudence, including those who face
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.138 In addition to expanding
protection to everyone, advocates of the universal turn argue that it would advance
equality, by avoiding “essentialism” and “backlash.”
1. Essentialism
One of the motivating impulses behind the universal turn is to avoid “making
assumptions about group cultures.”139 Because universalist solutions focus on
values like liberty or dignity, rather than claims to identity, they would theoretically
avoid essentialist ideas about identity groups such as “men” or “women.”
Anti-essentialism entails rejection of gender stereotyping—associating certain
behaviors, characteristics, or aptitudes with men or women.140 Any claim to rights
based on “women’s experiences” is essentialist because it assumes the category of
women has a unitary and coherent essence, whether based in biology or culture.
Another aspect of anti-essentialism is opposition to generalizations: rejecting
“the notion that a unitary, ‘essential’ women’s experience can be isolated and
described independently of race, class, sexual orientation, and other realities of
experience.”141 Intersecting axes of oppression, such as sexism, racism, classism,
and homophobia, cannot be reduced to just one dynamic. In addition to the
descriptive problems, there are normative problems with gender essentialism:
understanding oppression through the tunnel vision of a theory of gender
subordination may replicate other patterns of oppression.
Other feminists have argued that in creating rights against discrimination, the
law produces the very stigmatized identities it is intended to protect. Judith Butler
disputes that gender is “a timeless and inalterable ideal.”142 She describes gender as
a social norm that “only persists as a norm to the extent that it is acted out in social

138. See Fineman, supra note 12, at 3.
139. YOSHINO, supra note 12, at 189; see also id. at 191 (“While it need not do so, the
equality paradigm is prone to essentializing the identities it protects.”); Yoshino, supra note
12, at 795–96.
140. This theory has had some appeal for the Supreme Court. In Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins, the Court held that “we are beyond the day when an employer could evaluate
employees by assuming or insisting that they matched the stereotype associated with their
group,” and that no woman should be placed in a “catch 22” by “[a]n employer who objects
to aggressiveness in women but whose positions require this trait.” 490 U.S. 228, 251
(1989), modified by statute on other grounds recognized in Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539
U.S. 90, 98–102 (2003); see also United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996)
(finding that equal protection prohibits “overbroad generalizations about the different talents,
capacities, or preferences of males and females”); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677,
685 (1973) (describing a history of “gross, stereotyped distinctions between the sexes” in the
United States).
141. Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L.
REV. 581, 585 (1990).
142. JUDITH BUTLER, UNDOING GENDER 48 (2004).
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practice and reidealized and reinstituted in and through the daily social rituals of
bodily life.”143 At the same time that feminists build legal fences around women to
keep danger out, they are fencing women into constricting spaces:
To have a right as a woman is not to be free of being designated and
subordinated by gender. Rather, though it may entail some protection
from the most immobilizing features of that designation, it reinscribes
the designation as it protects us, and thus enables our further regulation
through that designation.144
For example, rights for women based on their roles as mothers do not simply reflect
the reality that many women are mothers; they promote that vision of reality. The
only “women” recognized by such a law will be mothers. Worse yet, whether
women’s roles as mothers are seen as fixed by nature or nurture, the appeal to static
gender roles makes resistance seem futile.145 This problem is debilitating to the
goal of undermining the gender norms that lock women into lives as mothers. Legal
rights based on gender may prevent people from dividing, sharing, permuting, and
questioning gender roles.
Essentialism is a problem not just for identity, but also for institutions, such as
the family (i.e., the idea that the essence of family is the sexualized union of a man
and a woman for purposes of procreation), and concepts, such as sexuality (i.e., the
idea that the essence of sexuality is heterosexual domination). To inscribe concepts
like “sex” and “family” into the law is to invite stereotypical constriction of their
meanings and to exclude outsiders from normative consideration. For example,
legal rules that allow only “family” members to inherit rent-stabilized apartments
can be difficult to enforce for same-sex partners.146
2. Backlash
A second theoretical advantage of the universal turn is avoiding the dangerous
political dynamics that result when the law seems to be “picking favorites among

143. Id. Butler also deconstructs the divide between biological sex and cultural gender.
This is not to deny biological differences, but to argue that we can only recognize and
understand those differences through culture. See Yoshino, supra note 26, at 866–68
(reading Butler as making a weak performative claim, not that “there is no biological
substrate to sex,” but rather, that “there may be a biological component to sex, but that we
will never be sure what that biological component is, as we can only apprehend it through
culture (that is, gender)”).
144. Wendy Brown, Suffering the Paradoxes of Rights, in LEFT LEGALISM/LEFT CRITIQUE
420, 422 (Wendy Brown & Janet Halley eds., 2002) (emphasis in original).
145. See Schultz, supra note 9, at 1892–93.
146. Compare 390 W. End Assocs. v. Wildfoerster, 661 N.Y.S.2d 202, 202–03 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1997) (stating that a “very close, loving relationship” in which a partner cared for
a tenant dying of AIDS was insufficient to qualify as a “family” relationship), with AFE
Realty Corp. v. Diamond, No. 2004-219 KC, slip op. (N.Y. App. Term, May 23, 2005)
(finding a familial relationship where the tenant cared for the occupant of the apartment
during his teenage years while his mother was sick, and later babysat his children in
exchange for help with shopping and paying bills).
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groups.”147 Legal rules caught up in “identity politics” can result in backlash,
leading to stigmatization of the identity group seeking recognition and polarization
of discussion. The result is to transfer the costs of the new policy to those it was
intended to protect.148 The arguments for universal protection, by contrast,
demonstrate how issues brought to light by the women’s movement point to larger
problems with the structure of the work environment for everyone.149 Seeing the
harm as a universal threat to dignity or autonomy avoids the politically fraught
process of drawing lines around identity groups.
Policies that appear to confer “special rights” can result in a counterproductive
dynamic of stigmatization.150 Political projects aimed at recognizing an identity
group and redistributing resources to that group “leav[e] intact the deep structures
that generate . . . disadvantage” and so “must make surface reallocations again and
again.”151 Affirmative action is a case study in the political limits of identity
politics. Advocates of affirmative action argued that purportedly meritocratic
processes of selection in education and employment were in fact skewed toward
privileged groups due to lingering effects of historical discrimination and current
forms of implicit bias.152 But by the mid-1990s, opponents of affirmative action had
characterized the policy as “unnecessary, unfair, and even un-American.”153 Even
those sympathetic to the “moral and empirical force” of the arguments for
affirmative action recognized that “there is a sense in which [these arguments were]
not being heard.”154 Affirmative-action advocates were unable to reframe the
debate because “[t]he most compelling moral claims [were] simply dismissed as
special-interest pleading.”155 Once “affirmative action” became anathema it had to

147. YOSHINO, supra note 12, at 188; see also Fineman, supra note 12, at 4; cf. Yoshino,
supra note 12, at 751–54 (discussing “pluralism anxiety,” which he defines as “apprehension
of and about [our country’s] demographic diversity”).
148. The effect is unfair. See Jeremy Waldron, Indirect Discrimination, in EQUALITY AND
DISCRIMINATION: ESSAYS IN FREEDOM AND JUSTICE 93, 97 (Stephen Guest & Alan Milne eds.,
1984) (“Since inequality is rooted in social and economic structures, the pursuit of equality
is difficult and costly. Who should bear these costs? The answer is, surely, that they should
be distributed as fairly as possible in society, like the other burdens and benefits of social cooperation.”).
149. Cf. LANI GUINIER & GERALD TORRES, THE MINER’S CANARY: ENLISTING RACE,
RESISTING POWER, TRANSFORMING DEMOCRACY 11 (2002) (“Those who are racially
marginalized are like the miner’s canary: their distress is the first sign of a danger that
threatens us all.”); Joan C. Williams, Canaries in the Mine: Work/Family Conflict and the
Law, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 2221 (2002).
150. In Nancy Fraser’s terms, the problem is the dilemma of “redistribution-recognition.”
FRASER, supra note 15, at 23.
151. Id. at 29.
152. See, e.g., Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection:
Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987).
153. Susan Sturm & Lani Guinier, The Future of Affirmative Action: Reclaiming the
Innovative Ideal, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 953, 954 (1996).
154. Id. at 955.
155. Id.
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be recast in terms of “diversity”—an ideal that aspires to inclusion rather than
equality.156
Relatedly, labeling a problem as “discrimination” can backfire.157 Secondgeneration forms of discrimination—for example, unexplained gender hierarchies
in the workplace—often overlap with “patterns of bad management, general worker
abuse, or other unprofessional conduct.”158 Calling the problem “sexism” may
result in a climate of hostility and recriminations rather than an atmosphere
conducive to problem solving.159 The process of drawing the “boundary lines
between unprofessional and discriminatory conduct can deflect attention from the
institutional dysfunction producing both types of problems.”160 A close case
becomes the focus of dissensus in the workplace, “pos[ing] the greatest risk of
polarization, delegitimation of the antidiscrimination norm, and perceived
unfairness if addressed primarily as a question of whether the challenged behavior
should be punished because it technically crossed the legal line.”161
C. Theoretical Disadvantages of the Universal Turn
The universal turn also entails potential risks in terms of equality, which I refer
to as “assimilation” and “dilution.”
1. Assimilation
Assimilation is the downside of crafting legal protections to avoid essentialist
notions of identity.162 Rights that are tailored to women’s experiences risk
essentializing those experiences and reinforcing women’s subordination, but

156. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); Erin Kelly & Frank Dobbin, How
Affirmative Action Became Diversity Management: Employer Response to
Antidiscrimination Law, 1961 to 1996, 41 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 960, 962 (1998).
157. Cf. Lani Guinier, Admissions Rituals as Political Acts: Guardians at the Gates of
Our Democratic Ideals, 117 HARV. L. REV. 113, 189–90 (2003) (describing race as a “neon
light” attracting backlash in school admissions cases because it is an “easy mark for the
frustration of those who are excluded by admissions choices—choices that have little to do
with race and much to do with discretionary, even arbitrary, decisionmaking”).
158. Sturm, supra note 25, at 472.
159. See Katharine T. Bartlett, Making Good on Good Intentions: The Critical Role of
Motivation in Reducing Implicit Workplace Discrimination, 95 VA. L. REV. 1893, 1901
(2009) (“[T]hreat and confrontation about race and gender bias, which people do not want to
possess or exhibit, may inadvertently provoke shame, guilt, and resentment, which lead to
avoidance and resistance, and ultimately to more stereotyping.”); cf. RICHARD THOMPSON
FORD, THE RACE CARD: HOW BLUFFING ABOUT BIAS MAKES RACE RELATIONS WORSE 340
(2008) (“Honest disagreement can lead to dialogue and reconciliation, but . . . the charge of
bigotry . . . leave[s] no room for persuasion or holding one’s peace—[it is an] attack[] on
character and integrity and must either be pressed to a conclusion or recanted and apologized
for.”).
160. Sturm, supra note 25, at 472–73.
161. Id. at 478.
162. See Joan C. Williams, Reconstructive Feminism: Changing the Way We Talk About
Gender and Work Thirty Years After the PDA, 21 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 79, 90 (2009).
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generic rights fail to redress specific harms typically suffered by women.163 Martha
Minow has referred to this problem as the “dilemma of difference.”164 Feminists
have long debated whether gender-blind or gender-conscious remedies can best
address discrimination. This debate is relevant to whether universal or targeted
solutions are best.
Generic rights may assist only those whose lives are patterned in the mold of the
privileged group. And worse, by making that mold seem more inclusive, generic
rights may legitimate structural conditions that contribute to inequality. The
problem with status-blind solutions is the myth of neutrality:
Equal treatment requires everyone to be measured according to the
same norms, but in fact there are no “neutral” norms of behavior and
performance. Where some groups are privileged and others oppressed,
the formulation of law, policy, and the rules of private institutions tend
to be biased in favor of the privileged groups, because their particular
experience implicitly sets the norm. 165
Gender-neutral rules assist “mostly women who have been able to construct a
biography that somewhat approximates the male norm.”166 To give a simple
example: a school admissions test that rewards students for making educated
guesses may seem objective, but if cultural norms inculcate risk-taking behavior in
males and discourage it in females, males will come out ahead on the test. The
females who succeed on the test will be those who had the resources or the luck to
learn risk taking. Although legal rules may be blind to difference, society and the
economy are not. Inequality in any one sphere—whether the home, the workplace,
or public life—can create inequality in the others.167
To gain rights equal to those of the privileged group, a disadvantaged group
must argue that it is like the privileged group in all relevant respects.168 By
accepting the baseline norm without question, and showing that it is amenable to

163. See Brown, supra note 144, at 430.
164. MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND
AMERICAN LAW 20 (1990) (“[W]hen does treating people differently emphasize their
differences and stigmatize or hinder them on that basis? and when does treating people the
same become insensitive to their difference and likely to stigmatize or hinder them on that
basis?” (emphasis in original)).
165. Young, supra note 19, at 269.
166. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW
37 (1987).
167. See MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND
EQUALITY 19–20 (1983) (discussing “complex equality”). I am indebted to Maxine Eichner
for this connection.
168. Equality doctrines are premised on an “Aristotelian logic” that the like be treated
alike and the different different. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Some Effects of Identity-Based
Social Movements on Constitutional Law in the Twentieth Century, 100 MICH. L. REV. 2062,
2395 (2002) (citing CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE
215–34 (1989)) (“[T]he complainant must show that she and her disadvantaged group are
‘like’ the people or group advantaged by the law’s classification.”); cf. Goldberg, supra note
34, at 779–80.
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the inclusion of disadvantaged groups, those disadvantaged groups bolster the
legitimacy of the baseline norm, and worsen the adverse sanctions for those who
would challenge or deviate from that norm. For example, some queer theorists
oppose the movement to legalize same-sex marriage because it would strengthen
the hegemony of marriage as an institution by demonstrating that marriage can
stretch to accommodate same-sex couples.169
I add to this account of assimilation by observing that assimilation can also
operate on the level of norms. For example, antidiscrimination norms might be lost
if they are assimilated into universal norms. To give an example, a generic
“diversity” norm that focuses on all forms of difference rather than historically
salient patterns of subordination could mean that “the white farm boy from Idaho is
considered as important to firm diversity as the black inner-city kid from Los
Angeles on the basis of geographic diversity, . . . justify[ing] a workforce that is
primarily white or male (but is diverse on other dimensions).”170
2. Dilution
Universal expansion of civil rights laws also presents another new risk. It could
dilute the rights of disadvantaged groups by trivializing the more serious harms of
discrimination and undermining support for antidiscrimination in general.
Moreover, it is likely to cost more to protect an expanded class of beneficiaries
from an expanded class of harms. Due to these increased costs, the level of
protection may be watered down.
Such arguments have been made against extending civil rights protections to
new groups or activities. Richard Thompson Ford has argued that “the fight for
social justice” is “an exercise in discretion as well as valor.”171 Ford argues that it
dilutes protection to analogize racism to other, less “serious” harms, such as
discriminatory grooming requirements,172 failure to recognize gay marriage,173
mistreatment of animals,174 and employment discrimination based on
appearance.175 Like the boy who cried “wolf,”176 those who cry “racism” too often
may lose protection when they need it most. “The good-natured humanitarian who
listens attentively to the first claim of social injustice will become an impatient
curmudgeon after multiple similar admonishments. . . . If goodwill is exhausted and
popular opinion sours, the coercive force of law will be of little effect.”177 Ford’s

169. See, e.g., MICHAEL WARNER, THE TROUBLE WITH NORMAL: SEX, POLITICS, AND THE
ETHICS OF QUEER LIFE (1999).
170. Lauren B. Edelman, Sally Riggs Fuller & Iona Mara-Drita, Diversity Rhetoric and
the Managerialization of Law, 106 AM. J. SOC. 1589, 1632 (2001).
171. FORD, supra note 159, at 337.
172. Id. at 146–56. Ford describes such harms as “racism without racists.” Id. at 37–92.
173. Id. at 106–22.
174. Id. at 93–98.
175. Id. at 122–46.
176. Julie C. Suk, Race Without Cards?, 5 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 111, 115 (2009)
(reviewing FORD, supra note 159).
177. Id. at 114 (alteration in original) (quoting FORD, supra note 159, at 176).
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argument has all the more force in the context of the universal turn, where the goal
is not just to expand protections incrementally, but to universalize them.
However, Ford’s argument relies on two assumptions, which may or may not
apply in any given policy context. First, Ford assumes “that there is a small, fixed
quantity of goodwill for civil rights causes, which should be used sparingly on the
most worthwhile of them.”178 At least with respect to the federal judiciary, Ford
may be right. Since Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly changed the pleading standard
in federal courts to allow district judges to dismiss claims they deem implausible,179
the rate of dismissal of discrimination cases has increased in a larger increment
than the rate of dismissal of other types of cases.180 When the extent of protection is
left up to the private sector, sometimes the response to the legal requirement that
everyone be treated the same is to treat everyone equally badly. For example, after
the Montana Supreme Court held that a state employer could not allow unmarried
cross-sex couples to purchase health insurance if unmarried same-sex couples could
not, the Montana Blue Cross Blue Shield dropped all unmarried couples from
coverage.181 To make a more simple point—more expansive workplace protections
require more resources for enforcement, such as an administrative agency or human
resources personnel, which can trade off with resources previously devoted to
assisting victims of discrimination.182
Second, Ford assumes that those playing the race card in new contexts will not
succeed in convincing the public that the analogy to racism is strong.183 But many
social movements have succeeded by analogizing new forms of discrimination to

178. Id. On the other hand, vanguard civil rights movements may lend legitimacy to the
rearguard by comparison. For example, the prospect of affirmative action for transsexuals
led one conservative to wax nostalgic about race-based affirmative action. See, e.g., Kim
Trobee, President Appoints ‘Transgendered’ Individual to Federal Post, CITIZENLINK (Jan.
4, 2010), http://www.citizenlink.com/2010/01/citizenlink-president-appoints-transgenderedindividual-to-federal-post (quoting Matt Barber, associate dean at Liberty University,
complaining that the appointment of a transgender individual to a federal post “isn’t like
appointing an African-American in order to try to provide diversity and right some kind of
discriminatory wrong”).
179. 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009).
180. See Patricia W. Hatamyar, The Tao of Pleading: Do Twombly and Iqbal Matter
Empirically?, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 553 (2010); Joseph A. Seiner, The Trouble with Twombly:
A Proposed Pleading Standard for Employment Discrimination Cases, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV.
1011, 1029–31; Kendall W. Hannon, Note, Much Ado About Twombly? A Study on the
Impact of Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly on 12(b)(6) Motions, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1811, 1815 (2008).
181. Carol Sanger, A Case for Civil Marriage, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 1311, 1317 (2006).
182. Cf. Janet E. Halley, “Like Race” Arguments, in WHAT’S LEFT OF THEORY?: NEW
WORK ON THE POLITICS OF LITERARY THEORY 40, 58–59 (Judith Butler, John Guillory &
Kendall Thomas eds., 2000).
183. See Suk, supra note 176, at 114.
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old ones.184 Ultimately, the question is whether a new claim of injustice has
merit.185
To make a different but related point, expanding protections to all can water
down protections for some, because rights must be more abstract and narrow to
apply to more contexts.186 For example, scholars have warned that extending
constitutional rights to noncitizens could “pose dangers to constitutional rights at
home” because “constitutional protections may suffer dilution when they are
extended into areas previously thought outside their coverage.”187 “Arguments for
limiting the rights in their new application have a way of filtering back to
undermine the original core.”188 Expanding a civil rights remedy may result in
lesser protections in the new context, with those limitations drifting back into the
core doctrine.
D. Assessing Particular Examples of the Universal Turn
The foregoing discussion provides a set of questions for critiquing any novel
universalist policy initiative to expand civil rights laws beyond equality. Does
universalization of an antidiscrimination rule avoid gender essentialism and the
political backlash against targeted protections? Or does it require a form of
assimilation that obscures gender discrimination and dilutes the resources available
to address it? These questions are important to any scholar or policy maker
concerned about whether particular protections can combat gender inequality.189

184. Id. at 116 (“Moral consensus condemning practices like racial segregation did not
exist before social movements made good-faith attempts to push the boundaries of existing
notions of racial equality.”).
185. Id. at 118.
186. Cf. KRISTIN BUMILLER, THE CIVIL RIGHTS SOCIETY: THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF
VICTIMS 117 (1988) (“[The] proliferation of antidiscrimination strategies . . . can be seen as
the logical extension of the universalization of rights—by including all groups, it further
dilutes the benefits received by the historically most disadvantaged groups.” (emphasis in
original)). On the other hand, scholars have argued that in theory, the expansion of
antidiscrimination statutes to cover new groups could require more capacious understandings
of the operation of discrimination generally, leading to the expansion of remedies available
to the original group. See Serena Mayeri, Reconstructing the Race-Sex Analogy, 49 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1789, 1789–90 (2008); Yoshino, supra note 26, at 781.
187. Gerald L. Neuman, Whose Constitution?, 100 YALE L.J. 909, 984 (1991); see also
Philip Hamburger, Beyond Protection, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1823, 1966–67 (2009) (“[W]hen
judges expand the substance of a right, they usually must overcome any costs by cutting
back on access, and when they expand access to a right, they usually must overcome any
costs by cutting back on the right itself. . . . The effect is not unlike the addition of water to
scotch. This ensures that there is enough to go around for everyone, but it satisfies no one.”).
188. Neuman, supra note 187, at 984. Neuman points to Justice Harlan’s opinion in the
1970 Supreme Court case Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 118 (1970) (Harlan, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part), in which the Court held that Florida’s six-member
jury statute satisfied the Sixth Amendment’s right to a trial by jury, and Justice Harlan
lamented that the historic twelve-member-jury guarantee in the federal system had thus been
diluted by incorporation of the Sixth Amendment against the states. Id.
189. My examples pertain to gender inequality, but this framework may also be helpful in
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FIGURE 2
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This is not to say that feminism is the only metric for evaluating policy.190
Rather, this Article aims to refute the claim that universalized protections would be
good for everyone, or that universalizing protections is the best way to secure
gender equality. An analysis of this sort may not reveal whether a universal policy
is beneficial from a utilitarian perspective,191 but it does reveal whether those
committed to equality should prioritize universal policies, and whether and how
those committed to equality should seek to modify policy proposals.
Essentialism, backlash, assimilation, and dilution are problems likely to
manifest themselves in varying degrees in response to any workplace protection.
The risk of any one of these problems is not a reason to reject a policy proposal, but
rather, something to be assessed in terms of the ultimate impact on the gendered
division of labor.
For example, at some level, every legal regime is essentialist: legal protections
are constructed around prototypical victims, and “the price of receiving legal
protection is the cost of acting in a manner that fits the prototype.”192 Yet rights
claims, such as the right to paid work or freedom from sexual violence, have
mitigated and attenuated gender subordination, creating the space that allows
women to pursue any political end.193 Therefore, we “cannot not want” rights, in
the words of Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak.194 Recognizing this dilemma, many
theorists advocate “strategic essentialism.”195 This does not mean that feminists

examining discrimination along other axes.
190. See JANET HALLEY, SPLIT DECISIONS: HOW AND WHY TO TAKE A BREAK FROM
FEMINISM (2006) (arguing against a sort of feminist tunnel vision which refuses to consider
any costs or benefits unrelated to advancing the cause of women).
191. For example, a policy that improved working conditions for men alone while
leaving the status of women unchanged might be justified from a utilitarian perspective, even
though it failed to reduce women’s inequality.
192. Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, The Law and Economics of Critical Race
Theory, 112 YALE L.J. 1757, 1827 (2003) (reviewing CROSSROADS, DIRECTIONS, AND A NEW
CRITICAL RACE THEORY (Frandisco Valdes, Jerome McCristal Culp & Angela P. Harris eds.,
2002)).
193. See Brown, supra note 144, at 422.
194. GAYATRI CHAKRAVORTY SPIVAK, OUTSIDE IN THE TEACHING MACHINE 46 (1993).
195. See GAYATRI CHAKRAVORTY SPIVAK, IN OTHER WORLDS: ESSAYS IN CULTURAL
POLITICS 205 (1987). Spivak herself later abandoned this phrase, if not the project, because
she thought it had “bec[o]me the union ticket for essentialism.” Sara Danius & Stefan
Jonsson, An Interview with Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, BOUNDARY 2, Summer 1993, at 24,
35 (quoting Spivak). For an overview of the theory, see Lara Karaian, The Troubled
Relationship of Feminist and Queer Legal Theory to Strategic Essentialism: Theory/Praxis,
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should write off the risks of essentialism, just that those risks must be assessed in
relation to the risks of other legal rules, and weighed against other potential
advantages and disadvantages of legal regimes.196
Likewise, assimilation is a risk that is endemic to law. As Yoshino puts it:
“[c]ivil rights practice, after all, is fundamentally about who has to change: The
homosexual or the homophobe? The woman or the sexist? The racial minority or
the racist?”197 Racial minorities may engage in strategic assimilation: “[t]he radical
multiculturalist insists that if assimilation will make greater demands on racial
minorities than on whites, it must be summarily rejected as discriminatory. But the
pragmatist would ask whether the unequal demands of assimilation are more or less
severe than the likely alternatives.”198
This Article does not endeavor to take a side in the debate between those who
are more concerned with essentialism and those who are more concerned with
assimilation. Nor does it assume that universal policies, rather than those targeted
at equality, will avoid identity politics but cause dilution. These are not debates that
can be resolved in the abstract. Rather, the preceding theoretical discussion is
intended as a template for analysis of how the universalization of particular legal
rules might impact gender equality. The next Part of this Article will examine antibullying and work-life accommodation mandates in terms of essentialism,
backlash, assimilation, and dilution.
III. UNIVERSAL BUT UNEQUAL
This Part will analyze two proposed universal policies: anti-bullying statutes,
along the lines of the Healthy Workplace Act,199 and procedural or substantive
rights to various types of work-life accommodations.200 Would new laws providing
a cause of action for bullying or a right to work-life accommodations better avoid
essentialism and backlash than targeted rules? Would they cause assimilation and
dilution? Unfortunately, anti-bullying and work-life accommodation rights do not
seem to resolve the problems of targeted laws. Additionally, these rules create new
disadvantages in terms of inequality.

Queer Porn, and Canadian Anti-Discrimination Law, in FEMINIST AND QUEER LEGAL
THEORY 375, 378–80 (Martha Albertson Fineman, Jack E. Jackson & Adam P. Romero eds.,
2009).
196. See Yoshino, supra note 26, at 933 (commenting that “the risk of essentialization
ought not to be understood in a vacuum, but rather relative to the risks of alternative
regimes”).
197. Id. at 938. To Yoshino, “it seems fanciful to be for or against assimilation, as
assimilation simply exists as a requirement of cultural intelligibility, of culture itself.” Id. at
930.
198. FORD, supra note 159, at 347.
199. See supra notes 71–75 and accompanying text.
200. See, e.g., Arnow-Richman, supra note 9 (advocating a law providing all employees
the right to request accommodations and imposing procedural obligations on employers to
consider the request).
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A. An Anti-Bullying Cause of Action
1. Essentialism: Creating New Scapegoats
Would anti-bullying rules move away from essentialist notions of gender and
other identities that are often produced in the interpretation, application, and
enforcement of sexual harassment law? Would universal rules avoid stigmatizing
women as potential plaintiffs and squelching any expression of sexuality in the
workplace?201 This Part concludes that while anti-bullying rules would avoid some
of the forms of essentialism promoted by sexual harassment law, they would not
necessarily avoid stigmatizing women or allowing employers to enforce puritanical
standards. This conclusion is provisional because no U.S. jurisdiction has yet
adopted an anti-bullying statute that can be studied empirically; however,
comparative legal scholarship suggests cause for concern.
a. Increased Inclusivity?
To be sure, an anti-bullying rule has many advantages over a sexual harassment
rule when it comes to avoiding essentialism. Defining harassment sans
discrimination would move away from gender stereotypes in which “women are
uniquely vulnerable to men[,] . . . men are always vulgar and loutish, or . . . women
have ‘special’ sensitivities and rights that men do not share.”202 An anti-bullying
rule would also avoid essentialist generalizations by protecting individuals harassed
for complex reasons—including hostility on account of a victim’s position at the
intersections and margins of identity groups. And an anti-bullying regime would
not privilege sex or race as a prohibited basis for discrimination. It would avoid all
suspect classes and classifications, protecting anyone from harassment, whether
because of sex, gender, race, orientation, appearance, or even, in the words of one
New York legislator, “[i]f somebody does not like you because you are [a] Yankees
fan.”203 It would not involve courts in outing alleged same-sex harassers.204 It
would not require inquiry into the often-inscrutable motives of harassers at all.
On its face, a generic harassment ban would protect more people than a ban on
discriminatory harassment. But even a generic harassment rule would not protect

201. See supra Part I.A.2.
202. Ehrenreich, supra note 8, at 21; see also id. at 53–54 (arguing that, by defining the
harm of sexual harassment as discrimination, the law promotes “an essentialist
understanding of workplace relations between the sexes”); Fisk, supra note 8, at 85 (arguing
that the illumination of the unique harm of sexual harassment had an unintended effect:
“[f]ocusing on the psyches of women may perpetuate a protectionist assumption when courts
do not consider this kind of expert evidence about the corrosive effect of workplace
humiliation on the psyches of men”).
203. Interview by Neil Cavuto with Bob Barra, Member, N.Y. State Assembly (Aug. 22,
2007) (discussing the differences between a bullying prohibition and a sexual harassment
prohibition).
204. Cf. supra note 31 and accompanying text (discussing how, under Oncale, a plaintiff
can prove same-sex harassment is discriminatory in a Title VII case by showing the harasser
is homosexual).
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everyone. Less-skilled, unorganized workers—who are more often people of color,
women, and undocumented immigrants—are more likely to do precarious work and
hence are more susceptible to workplace abuse.205 Yet these are the workers least
able to bring complaints or civil litigation. And the tort experience suggests that
courts may not recognize bullying against marginalized workers as an assault to
dignity. If a worker is already marginalized, courts raise the bar for actionable
offenses. “The humiliations that courts deem outrageous enough to be actionable
seem heavily influenced by the court’s notions of status, gender, and class.”206
Courts are likely to recognize infringements on dignity only when a high-status
person suffers an insult to that status—for example, when the executive is punished
with janitorial duties.207
b. New Gender Stereotypes
Although anti-bullying rules would expand protection to certain privileged
workers, they would also have the unintended effects of opening new avenues for
essentialism. Many of the essentialist problems with sexual harassment were
unintended. For women’s stories to resonate with employers, juries, and judges,
those stories had to conform to a prototypical account of sexual harassment in the
workplace, generally involving crass male behavior and feminine sensitivity.
Would an anti-bullying law differently construct workplace victims and
perpetrators? What are the prototypical stories of workplace bullying, and how do
they differ from the prototypical stories of sexual harassment?
If popular culture is any guide, the prototypical workplace bully is a woman.208
In the media’s coverage of the anti-bullying movement, news programs have aired

205. Regina Austin, Employer Abuse, Worker Resistance, and the Tort of Intentional
Infliction of Emotional Distress, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1, 41–42 (1988).
206. Fisk, supra note 8, at 89.
207. Wilson v. Monarch Paper Co., 939 F.2d 1138, 1145 (5th Cir. 1991) (“We find it
difficult to conceive a workplace scenario more painful and embarrassing than an executive,
indeed a vice-president and the assistant to the president, being subjected before his fellow
employees to the most menial janitorial services and duties of cleaning up after entry level
employees: the steep downhill push to total humiliation was complete.”). Fisk thinks it is
“difficult to rationally explain why working as a janitor may have dignity for some, be
humiliating but not actionable for others, and constitute actionable humiliation for a few.”
Fisk, supra note 8, at 88.
208. See, e.g., Judith P. Miller, Review: The Devil Wears Prada and Working Girl:
Sympathy for the Devil, 19 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 221, 221 (2007). A large percentage of
workplace bullies are reported to be women. See WORKPLACE BULLYING INST., (STILL)
BULLYING WITH IMPUNITY: LABOR DAY SURVEY 2 (Sept. 2009), available at
http://www.workplacebullying.org/res/N-N-2009D.pdf (reporting that 65% of workplace
bullies are women, according to a nonscientific survey of 422 self-selected online
respondents). But see WORKPLACE BULLYING INST. & ZOGBY INT’L, U.S. WORKPLACE
BULLYING SURVEY 7 (Sept. 2007), available at http://www.workplacebullying.org/res/N-NZogby2007.pdf (reporting that 40% of workplace bullies are women, according to online
interviews of 7740 representative adults). A self-help industry has sprung up for these socalled “bully broads.” See, e.g., JEAN HOLLANDS, SAME GAME DIFFERENT RULES: HOW TO
GET AHEAD WITHOUT BEING A BULLY BROAD, ICE QUEEN, OR “MS. UNDERSTOOD” (2002)
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clips from the popular film The Devil Wears Prada to demonstrate bullying.209 In
that movie, the title character, the editor of a successful fashion magazine, is
criticized for sending her younger female assistants on impossible housekeeping
and childcare errands, and treating them with cold disdain.210 At one point, the
movie’s heroine points out the double standard: “If she were a man, the only thing
people would talk about is how good she is at her job!”211 One feminist critic has
concluded that the movie “transforms the genre of punishing uppity women for
violating gender norms into a celebration of ambition in women and a recognition
of the real behind-the-scenes labor—women’s work—which enables the
contemporary workplace.”212 Subjecting devils in Prada to legal liability would
work against this subversive possibility.
Such dramas are not just in the movies; they also fill deposition transcripts. For
example, in one discrimination case, a plaintiff testified that her female boss was
“harassing, demeaning, bullying, vicious, vile and vindictive,” while other
witnesses described the boss as simply “hard-nosed,” “abrupt,” and “rude,” with a
“dominating personality.”213 The dispute was never resolved because the court held
that the boss “was an equal opportunity oppressor, using her intense, dominant,
abrupt, rude, and hard-nosed management style on all . . . employees.”214 If an antibullying statute had applied, a judge or jury would have been required to decide
whether this equal opportunity oppressor’s bad management tactics were illegal. In
a culture that expects women to be caring and motherly, women would face harsher
scrutiny than men for the same behavior.215
(book by “executive coach” to help intimidating women tone it down).
209. See, e.g., Good Morning America (ABC television broadcast Feb. 24, 2009)
(showing a clip from The Devil Wears Prada during a segment on workplace bullying); The
Today Show (NBC television broadcast July 14, 2009) (same).
210. THE DEVIL WEARS PRADA (Twentieth Century Fox 2006).
211. Id. For a legal example of this type of double standard, see Jeffrey Rosen, The Case
Against Sotomayor, NEW REPUBLIC (May 4, 2009), http://www.tnr.com/article/politics/thecase-against-sotomayor (“The most consistent concern was that Sotomayor, although an able
lawyer, was ‘not that smart and kind of a bully on the bench,’ as one former Second Circuit
clerk for another judge put it.”).
212. Miller, supra note 208, at 225; see also Rebecca Traister, Sympathy for the SheDevil, SALON.COM (June 30, 2006), http://www.salon.com/mwt/feature/2006/06/30/
women_bosses/index.html.
213. Frye v. St. Thomas Health Servs., 227 S.W.3d 595, 607–08 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007).
214. Id. at 609.
215. See, e.g., CATALYST, THE DOUBLE-BIND DILEMMA FOR WOMEN IN LEADERSHIP: DAMNED
IF YOU DO, DOOMED IF YOU DON’T 4, 8 (2007), available at http://www.catalyst.org/file/45/the%
20doublebind%20dilemma%20for%20women%20in%20leadership%20damned%20if%20you
%20do,%20doomed%20if%20you%20don’t.pdf (qualitative analysis of surveys of twelve hundred
business leaders concluded that female leaders are more likely to be seen as either “too soft” or “too
tough,” but “never just right,” and either competent or likeable, but rarely both); Victoria L.
Brescoll & Eric Luis Uhlmann, Can an Angry Woman Get Ahead?: Status Conferral, Gender, and
Expression of Emotion in the Workplace, 19 PSYCHOL. SCI. 268 (2008) (study of adults shown
videotaped scenarios demonstrated that women who expressed anger in a professional context were
considered entitled to lower status than men expressing the same emotion); Joan C. Williams, The
Social Psychology of Stereotyping: Using Social Science to Litigate Gender Discrimination Cases
and Defang the “Cluelessness” Defense, 7 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 401 (2003) (discussing
stereotypes that impede women’s workplace equality); Ramit Mizrahi, Note, “Hostility to the
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What about the victims? Some survey data indicates that 56.7% of the victims of
bullying are female.216 Such surveys prompt essentialist theorizing.217 One scholar
has argued that playground socialization shunts girls into passive aggression and
boys into active aggression, patterns replicated in adult workplace bullying
situations.218 The analysis then veers off into essentialist territory, referring to
“innate and socially conditioned differences” between men and women that render
women uniquely vulnerable to bullying.219 Because the study of bullying grew out
of industrial psychology, the phenomenon may be apt to be considered in terms of
psychological profiles of victims and aggressors. These profiles are then marshaled
to support essentialist conclusions about men and women. The media has latched
onto the phenomenon of women bullying other women; some articles characterize
this form of sabotage as a violation of “their shared identity as women,” like
mothers eating their young.220 But as Leymann pointed out when confronted with
similar findings in Swedish research, the sex segregation of bullying is not
surprising when one considers that most workplaces are sex segregated.221
And if anti-bullying rules are simply added on to sexual harassment rules, they
will give employers more, not fewer, opportunities to employ stereotypes in
policing workplace expression.222 Schultz asks whether holding employers liable
for bullying would give them “a progressive justification for firing employees
whose colorful language or aggressive styles threaten management authority, even
if those employees aren’t genuinely abusive to anyone.”223 Groups who already
face stereotypes, for example, African Americans who are presumed to be “overly
aggressive,” are likely to bear the brunt of new bullying rules.224 Although anti-

Presence of Women”: Why Women Undermine Each Other in the Workplace and the
Consequences for Title VII, 113 YALE L.J. 1579, 1589–91 (2004).
216. WORKPLACE BULLYING INST. & ZOGBY INT’L, supra note 208, at 7.
217. See, e.g., Mizrahi, supra note 215, at 1591–93 (describing and criticizing “[b]iologyand socialization-based explanations for female hostility”).
218. Kerri Lynn Stone, From Queen Bees and WannaBes to Worker Bees: Why Gender
Considerations Should Inform the Emerging Law of Workplace Bullying, 65 N.Y.U. ANN.
SURV. AM. L. 35, 52–53 (2009) (discussing RACHEL SIMMONS, ODD GIRL OUT: THE HIDDEN
CULTURE OF AGGRESSION IN GIRLS (2002)).
219. Id. at 62.
220. Mickey Meece, Backlash: Women Bullying Women, N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 2009, at
1. By contrast, very little is written on female-on-female sexual harassment cases alleging
gender-based hostility, rather than same-sex sexual desire. See Mizrahi, supra note 215, at
1585–86 (counting only twenty-three such cases).
221. Heinz Leymann, The Content and Development of Mobbing at Work, 5 EUR. J.
WORK & ORG. PSYCHOL. 165, 175 (1996); see also Boushey, supra note 23, at 39–40
(describing continued sex segregation of American workforce); Mizrahi, supra note 215, at
1594–1607 (discussing how workplace sex segregation results in “female-on-female
hostility”).
222. See Vicki Schultz, Gabrielle S. Friedman, Abigail C. Saguy, Tanya K. Hernandez &
David Yamada, Global Perspectives on Workplace Harassment Law: Proceedings of the
2004 Annual Meeting, Association of American Law Schools Section on Labor Relations and
Employment Law, 8 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 151, 188–89 (2004) [hereinafter Global
Perspectives].
223. Id. at 192; see also Ehrenreich, supra note 8, at 59.
224. See Global Perspectives, supra note 222, at 188–93.
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bullying laws have not been enforced through pre-emptive firings in Quebec, in
that province, “workers have a right to reinstatement for unjust dismissal and are
much more likely to be represented by a union.”225 In the United States,
employment is at will and fewer workers are unionized.
c. Enforcing Traditional Sexual Mores
Anti-bullying rules have the advantage of steering the focus away from sexual
conduct to all degrading conduct. This was part of the impetus behind France’s
enactment of a law against moral harassment226—to avoid the “puritanical” focus
of American sexual harassment law.227 Arguably, a moral harassment law is a step
away from the sanitized workplace. But words like “dignity,” “civility,” and
“decency” hearken back to an archaic aristocratic ethos, with all its puritanical
gender norms.228 Handing these concepts over to conservative employers and
judges may result in application of standards like “that’s no way to treat a lady.”229
The Israeli experience with dignity-based protections provides “a cautionary
tale” for radical reformers.230 Seeking to avoid the limitations of the American
preoccupation with anticlassification, Israeli feminists advocated and won passage
of a sexual harassment law grounded in both dignity and equality, with the
emphasis on dignity.231 But the concept of dignity proved “highly susceptible to
traditional and patriarchal interpretations.”232 For example, one harassment case
referred to the harm as the male harasser’s violation of his duty “carefully to watch

225. Debra Parkes, Targeting Workplace Harassment in Quebec: On Exporting a New
Legislative Agenda, 8 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 423, 451 (2004).
226. The law provides civil and criminal penalties for acts that degrade an employee’s
right to dignity, affect an employee’s mental or physical health, or compromise an
employee’s career. See C. TRAV. art. L122-46 to -54; see also C. PEN. art. 222-33-2.
227. See Friedman & Whitman, supra note 64, at 270 (“The American concern with
sexual harassment, according to this widespread continental point of view, is of a piece with
the American inability to accept bare breasts on television or on public beaches, with the
illegality of prostitution in most American jurisdictions, with Americans’ comical ineptness
in flirting and their excessive horror at adultery.”).
228. See Libby Adler, The Dignity of Sex, 17 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 1, 3 (2008)
(describing both an elitist and a universalistic sense of dignity, and arguing that the two
meanings are analytically intertwined); James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of
Privacy: Dignity Versus Liberty, 113 Yale L.J. 1151, 1168–69 (2004) (discussing etiquette
as one of the “social roots of European dignitary law”).
229. Cf. Reva B. Siegel, Introduction: A Short History of Sexual Harassment, in
DIRECTIONS IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW, supra note 47, at 1, 17 (arguing that the failure to
explain why sexual coercion of women in the workplace is harmful “means that
antidiscrimination law rather unselfconsciously incorporates a gender-conventional
understanding of why harassment harms women (it is a form of socially inappropriate
conduct, ‘not a nice way to treat a lady’)”).
230. Noya Rimalt, Stereotyping Women, Individualizing Harassment: The Dignitary
Paradigm of Sexual Harassment Law Between the Limits of Law and the Limits of Feminism,
19 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 391, 395 (2008).
231. Id. at 392.
232. Id. at 446.
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over” the female plaintiff—an “inexperienced young woman soldier” and a
“precious pledge.”233 Thus, it is not clear that laws underscored by dignity
principles would avoid essentializing sexuality any better than laws underscored by
antidiscrimination principles.
2. Backlash: Shifting Identity Politics
Many anti-bullying advocates argue that their policies will avoid identity
politics and the attendant stigmatization, backlash, and polarization.234 Appeals to
“dignity” may resonate with persons who cannot listen to “feminism,” “women’s
rights,” “sexism,” “sexual harassment,” and the like.235 One scholar has gone so far
as to argue that “[t]he impression that law will aid only some people in the quest
for a workplace free of harassment and humiliation provides a cover of legitimacy,
and perhaps even fuel, for a backlash that may undermine all anti-discrimination
law.”236
However, it is not clear that enacting more anti-harassment rules would diffuse
the backlash. Researchers are “on the fence” between (1) linking bullying to sexual
and racial harassment, a strategy that “carries a risk that workplace bullying will
become contaminated by association and similarly undermined as a manifestation
of ‘political correctness,’” or (2) claiming that bullying is an entirely distinct
phenomenon, thereby missing the opportunity to draw from the established
discourse on sexual and racial harassment.237
The U.S. anti-bullying movement has attempted both strategies: linking itself to
movements for equality and claiming the universal high ground. New York’s antibullying initiative is supported by the NAACP, the Business and Professional
Women of New York State, and several unions.238 The bill’s advocates have not

233. Id. at 419 (quoting HCJ 1284/99 Jane Doe v. IDF Commander (Galili) [1999] IsrSC
53(2) 70). Perhaps the problem is that tying the concept of harassment to sexualized conduct,
as Israel’s dignity-based law does, may provide a means for enforcement of retrograde
sexual mores. Id. at 394 (“[T]he dignitary paradigm of sexual harassment is explicitly
correlated with sexual behaviors. Courts focus on the ‘sexual’ in sexual harassment, thereby
legitimating other forms of sex-based harassment that working women often experience.”).
Israel chose to criminalize sexual harassment as a practice associated with “other sex
offenses, such as ‘indecent behavior.’” Id.
234. See, e.g., Coleman, supra note 8, at 89–90 (“[A] status-neutral approach does not
involve a zero-sum game. That is, moving from a ‘status-based’ to a ‘status-neutral’
approach enlarges the pie rather than leads to battles over the size of slices . . . .”);
Ehrenreich, supra note 8, at 63 (“A tort approach to the workplace harassment of women
emphasizes that such harassment is not wrong because women somehow have ‘special’
rights.”); Friedman & Whitman, supra note 64, at 272 (arguing that sexual harassment law
appears “to create a zero-sum conflict between women and workers” that “stir[s] up
competition among the classes of potential ‘disadvantaged’ beneficiaries”).
235. See Anita Bernstein, Treating Sexual Harassment with Respect, 111 HARV. L. REV.
446 (1997).
236. Fisk, supra note 8, at 93.
237. Deborah Lee, Gendered Workplace Bullying in the Restructured UK Civil Service,
31 PERSONNEL REV. 205, 209 (2002).
238. See, e.g., 2010 Legislative Summary, NEW YORK HEALTHY WORKPLACE
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foregrounded the policy’s links to sexual and racial harassment; rather, they
characterize bullying as a public health issue, naming their legislation the “Healthy
Workplace Bill” and invoking the need to protect human dignity.239 But this
packaging has not obscured the anti-bullying movement’s linkages to civil rights
controversies. In Illinois, one Christian lobbying group claims, “Many of the
‘Bullying Programs’ are actually being used to promote and protect homosexuality
in the workplace.”240 Other right-wing groups demanded that the bill exclude
religious expression from the definition of “‘abusive conduct’ unless the
[aggresssor’s] intent is to intimidate or harass.”241 Anti-bullying advocates have
responded by referring to these lobbyists as “anti-gay” and “extremist,” and by
exhorting legislators “to tell these hate-mongerers to keep their hands off our
legislation designed to provide dignity for EVERYONE!!”242
Arguably, an anti-bullying rule would eliminate any tendency for employers to
prefer men over women in hiring out of concern that women are more likely to
bring harassment suits.243 Expanding the class of potential workplace harassment
plaintiffs to include individuals who are not discrimination victims could mean that
more white men bring suit, and employers would be less likely to see women and
minorities as costly liabilities in hiring decisions.244 But if women are stereotyped
as both the aggressors and victims in most bullying cases, a new law could
exacerbate the incentives not to hire female workers.
It is also unlikely that anti-bullying rules will avoid the destructive workplace
dynamics of accusations of status-based mistreatment. The language of “bullying”
can make it difficult for organizations to take “collective responsibility” for the
problem, because individuals are “repelled by the spectre of being labelled as a
pathological predator or having to define their experiences as the victims of such a
person.”245 To the extent that the psychological-profiling model predominates in
the discussion on workplace harassment (as adoption of the popular name
“bullying” suggests that it does), new rights claims are not likely to make
workplaces any less antagonistic.

ADVOCATES, http://www.nyhwa.org/index.html; see also Yamada, supra note 8, at 268.
239. See Yamada, supra note 8, at 277–78.
240. Concerned Christian Americans, Christianity in the Workplace Under Attack,
CONCERNED CHRISTIANS NEWSLETTER (Mar. 2009), http://www.concernedchristian
americans.com/node/272.
241. BIG News on Illinois Healthy Workplace Bill SB3566, STOP WORKPLACE BULLYING!
(Mar. 2010), http://bullyfreeworkplace.org/id37.html.
242. Current Status & News, HEALTHY WORKPLACE BILL, http://www.healthyworkplace
bill.org/states/il/illinois.php (capitalization and punctuation in original).
243. Cf. supra notes 43–44 and accompanying text.
244. Whether this hypothesis would bear out empirically is a question for further
research.
245. Caitlin Buon & Tony Buon, The ‘Bully’ Within, COUNSELING AT WORK, Summer
2007, at 5, 8 (“[H]ow can we get the parties to the table if both parties are only able to speak
about bullying using language that is shame-and-blame based and carries with it the
emotional baggage of the ‘pathological’ or predatory bully when in all likelihood this does
not reflect their actual experience?”).
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3. Assimilation: Depoliticizing Sexism
a. Undermining Sexual Harassment Law
Bullying has been referred to as “status-neutral” or “generic” harassment, a label
that invites the classic feminist critique of assimilationist reform strategies.246 The
problem of bullying is not status-neutral.247 Rather, bullying often takes the form of
sexual harassment, and even “generic” harassment disproportionately affects
women and those who do not conform to gender norms.248 A legal response to
bullying that does not account for the gendered nature of the injury cannot solve the
problem.
Part of the reason for the development of the Title VII doctrine of sexual
harassment was that torts like intentional infliction of emotional distress failed to
address sexual harassment.249 To prove an intentional infliction of emotional
distress claim, a plaintiff has to show that the conduct that caused the distress
would have been “outrageous” to a reasonable person.250 Judges and juries would
ask, “what [is] so outrageous about a dirty joke or a crude proposition . . . ?”251
“[M]ale judges . . . could not see why come-ons, however crude, should not be seen
as compliments and . . . could not understand why women should not just have to
put up with dirty jokes if they wanted to participate in a male world.”252 The norm
established by tort law was one in which sexist joking and crude propositions were
just part of doing business. To survive in such environments, women had to
assimilate to the discriminatory culture. They had to accept that they were going to
be considered the objects of jokes and sexual advances, rather than being seen as
equally qualified workers. Tort law could not account for sexual harassment as a
mode of gender subordination. Crafting a new cause of action under Title VII was
not just a legal strategy, but also a political move designed to highlight the
gendered dimensions of the problem of workplace harassment.253

246. See Corbett, supra note 8, at 140–42 (“[S]tatus-blind harassment law is grounded on
arguments made by proponents of the formal equality theory of employment antidiscrimination law, or perhaps more pointedly, opponents of the protected-class theory.”).
247. See Fisk, supra note 8, at 80 (“To the extent that law has focused more
systematically on the humiliation of women and people of color at work, the focus is
justifiable because of the extraordinary destructiveness of being shamed for one’s very
identity and because of the pervasiveness of such humiliation that members of the dominant
group never need confront.”).
248. See Fisk, supra note 8, at 80; McGinley, supra note 32, at 1154–55.
249. Ehrenreich, supra note 8, at 33. Ehrenreich nonetheless concludes that a
reinvigorated workplace tort regime could now supplement sexual harassment law. Id. at 3–
4.
250. Id. at 33.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. MacKinnon rejected gender-neutral approaches to sexual harassment because, “by
treating the incidents as if they are outrages particular to an individual woman rather than
integral to her social status as a woman worker,” gender-neutral rules failed to redress
gender dominance. MACKINNON, supra note 29, at 88.
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An anti-harassment rule focused on dignity, rather than gender, could undermine
the impetus for courts, employers, and employees to consider how certain
workplace interactions contribute to gender subordination.254 If discriminatory
harassment is subsumed under the broader category of bullying, “we may lose sight
altogether of the more subtle and insidious ways that harassment is linked to
discrimination and structural inequality in workplaces.”255 The psychological
theories that explain bullying sit uneasily with the theory of sexual harassment as
gender subordination. Indeed, many of the mobbing researchers have been
ambivalent as to whether gender is even a factor in the phenomenon.256 It is not the
case that we must always name gender discrimination to fix it;257 just as
discrimination may operate in subtle or unconscious ways, so may its solutions. But
it is a fair point that because it may be easier to label conduct as bullying,
employers may ignore how bullying could be part of a pattern of discrimination.258
In a typical German labor-law text, the pages covering mobbing far outnumber
those on sexual harassment.259 In that country, women may have less access to
grievance resolution procedures to address mobbing than established male
workers.260 In this country too, labor movements have been slow to recognize
sexual harassment complaints.261

254. Kathryn Abrams, The New Jurisprudence of Sexual Harassment, 83 CORNELL L.
REV. 1169, 1187–88 (1998) (“Triers of fact may not recognize the gendered forms that
disrespect takes. Employers charged with prevention may not recognize the subtly
stereotypic or devaluative attitudes that increasingly fuel harassment as women move into
the workplace in greater numbers and as competition becomes more intense. Employees
asked to modify their behavior prospectively may not grasp the range of conduct that is
forbidden or the underlying attitudes that need to be re-examined.” (footnotes omitted)).
255. Parkes, supra note 225, at 449; see also Lee, supra note 237, at 209 (“[I]f sexual and
racial harassment are defined as only types of bullying, this might undermine the specificity
and visibility of sexual and racial harassment.”).
256. See Lee, supra note 237, at 206–08 (describing the various views of bullying
researchers on the connection between bullying and sexual and racial harassment).
257. But see Parkes, supra note 225, at 450.
258. Id. at 451.
259. Friedman & Whitman, supra note 64, at 257 (“A standard 2001 handbook on
German labor law will now devote a couple of sentences to sexual harassment as ‘a special
legislative expression of the protection of personality’—and then go on to devote several
pages to mobbing.”).
260. See Gabrielle S. Friedman, The Real Harm, LEGAL AFFAIRS, Sept./Oct. 2003, at 30,
34 (“In Germany, anecdotal evidence suggests that men—many of them middle managers—
are more likely than women to bring mobbing complaints to their firm’s grievance resolution
boards.”).
261. See Marion Crain, Strategies for Union Relevance in a Post-Industrial World:
Reconceiving Antidiscrimination Rights as Collective Rights, 57 LAB. L.J. 158, 162 (2006)
(“Threats to male workers’ job security posed by women’s sexual harassment complaints are
viewed as raising collective economic issues that are the traditional province of unions,
while the right to be free from sexual harassment on the job is conceived of as a
noneconomic, personal, individual interest.”).
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b. Depoliticizing Harassment
A bullying rule could “neuter” sexual harassment law through an “apolitical”
account of the harm.262 Enacting a rule to remedy harassment as a dignitary injury
could obscure the significance of harassment as a tool of discrimination.263 Even
worse, it could be part of a political project that denies the existence of
discrimination in a post-racist, post-sexist era. Indeed, one scholar attributes the
rise of status-neutral initiatives to the fact that “a significant segment of society
believes that forty years of powerful legal intervention has abated virulent
workplace discrimination against African Americans, women, and others.”264 In
Canada too, “much of the literature on bullying and psychological harassment
contains the implicit or explicit assumption that sexual harassment is no longer a
problem or, at least, is much less of a problem than workplace bullying.”265
Some scholars advocate a substitutive approach that would replace sexual
harassment law with a gender-neutral regime.266 Other scholars reject the
substitutive approach as antifeminist and advocate an additive approach: allow
victims to “have it both ways” by raising Title VII claims alongside claims of
dignitary injuries.267 But even the additive legal approach risks undermining
feminist political concerns.268 Workplace harassment law has an enormous
expressive effect because it regulates quotidian interactions, sets standards of
etiquette, and is a topic of public fascination.269 Dignity is depoliticizing.270 “Say
‘dignity,’ and you have opened the class of women to the competition of a
numberless population of those who feel themselves no less oppressed.”271

262. Abrams, supra note 254, at 1185–86.
263. Id. at 1186–87 (acknowledging that harassment injures a worker’s dignity, but
cautioning that “if we do not appreciate that this dignitary injury is a function of, and
connected to, other injuries within an unequal, hierarchical relationship, we miss much of
what is morally and politically significant about the wrong”).
264. Corbett, supra note 8, at 100.
265. Parkes, supra note 225, at 448.
266. For defenses of the substitutive approach, see Coleman, supra note 8, at 89–90;
Mark McLaughlin Hager, Harassment as a Tort: Why Title VII Hostile Environment
Liability Should Be Curtailed, 30 CONN. L. REV. 375 (1998); Ellen Frankel Paul, Sexual
Harassment as Sex Discrimination: A Defective Paradigm, 8 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 333
(1990).
267. Ehrenreich, supra note 8, at 62. Ehrenreich focuses on expanding tort remedies,
although she notes the possibility of a “state statutory approach to workplace harassment.”
Id. at 54 n.244; see also Yamada, Crafting, supra note 60, at 507 (“The Healthy Workplace
Bill is meant to supplement, not supplant, current laws against discrimination and
harassment grounded in a target’s protected class status.”).
268. See Friedman & Whitman, supra note 64, at 272 (Although, “[w]ithin the
intellectual world of the law, it makes no logical sense to respond to the claim ‘women are
being harassed’ with the riposte, ‘well everybody else is harassed too[,]’ . . . that kind of
riposte is devastating indeed within the logic of everyday political argument.” (emphasis in
original)).
269. Id.
270. See id. at 273.
271. Id.
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In other countries that have enacted generic harassment bans, the feminist
objections to gender-based harassment have taken a back seat. In Europe, the
“movement against employee harassment is beginning to submerge the movement
against sexual harassment.”272 There, sexual harassment “is becoming simply one
variety of employee harassment—and not necessarily the most important variety
either.”273 In Germany, “feminism aims at social change, and mobbing [law] tends
to privilege older and more established workers and traditional ideas of social
status.”274 And in Quebec, “sexual harassment and other forms of discriminatory
harassment are generally characterized as a sub-set of psychological harassment,
both formally in legislation and informally in popular discussion of the law.”275
Also in Israel, “in the analysis of sexual harassment and its harms, this caselaw
prioritizes dignity over equality so much so that the discriminatory aspects of this
social practice are no longer part of the legal discourse.”276 These comparative law
lessons should be considered carefully by proponents of anti-bullying law in the
United States.277
c. Legitimating Hostile Structures
Anti-bullying rules could also legitimate the structural dimensions of work that
result in hostile environments. To see why, it is helpful to take a step back and
consider two divergent strands of theory on the origins of mobbing: (1) psychology,
which holds that “mobbing results from the collision of victim personalities and
abuser personalities,” and (2) organizational theory, which holds that “mobbing is
the result of a dysfunctional communication pattern.”278 Research has identified
many other structural causes of bullying—the growth of a service sector economy
that requires more personal interaction in the form of “emotional labor,” the “siege
mentality” resulting from increased pressure to provide more goods and services at
a lower cost in a globalized economy, the decline of unions as “safety valve[s]” for
resolving disputes, the failure to manage diversity, and the increased reliance on
contingent workers considered “depersonalized” and “disposable.”279 These
dynamics are unlikely to be reversed by new legal prohibitions on bullying.
Advocates of the anti-bullying movement emphasize the psychological model

272. Id. at 243.
273. Id.
274. Global Perspectives, supra note 222, at 159.
275. Parkes, supra note 225, at 447.
276. Rimalt, supra note 230, at 393. It is important to keep in mind, however, that Israel,
unlike the United States, has afforded “constitutional status” to human dignity but not to
equality. Id. at 404–05.
277. See Friedman & Whitman, supra note 64, at 243 (concluding that the lesson for
American scholars is that “[w]e may not be able to pursue the goals of dignity without
sacrificing some or all of the goals of anti-discrimination”).
278. Global Perspectives, supra note 222, at 157.
279. Yamada, Phenomenon, supra note 60, at 485–91; see also Nathan A. Bowling &
Terry A. Beehr, Workplace Harassment from the Victim’s Perspective: A Theoretical Model
and Meta-Analysis, 91 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 998, 1005 (2006).

2011]

BEYOND EQUALITY

1263

almost exclusively.280 The psychological literature on bullying takes an
individualized approach to the problem—identifying victims and perpetrators—
rather than looking for structural or systemic causes.281 Legal prohibitions based on
the psychological model would shift the blame from corporate and economic
structures to a few bad apples.
4. Dilution: Swallowing Sexual Harassment
Anti-bullying rules would expand the class of potential harassment plaintiffs.
They would also make it easier for plaintiffs to recover, because those plaintiffs
would not have to establish proof that the harassment was “because of sex” (or
otherwise discriminatory). But expansion of sexual harassment doctrine to include
nondiscriminatory hostile work environments could also risk trivializing the harms
of discrimination and diluting protections.
The very rubric of bullying implies that the problem is trivial. It evokes the
schoolyard and the problems of children.282 Anti-bullying advocates may have
chosen the wrong mantra for their movement. Indeed, there is no consensus on
whether the phenomenon should be called abuse, bullying, mobbing, moral
harassment, psychological harassment, generic harassment, or something else.283
The term “mobbing” sounds foreign and animalistic,284 and “harassment” risks
association with sexual harassment and identity politics. The concept of
“offensiveness” sounds like political correctness and the idea of “incivility” sounds
like the standard of an age gone by.285
Many stories of purported mobbing evoke not sympathy but impatience about
overly sensitive victims overreacting to ordinary office politics.286 Cultural

280. See, e.g., Frequently Asked Questions, WORKPLACE BULLYING INSTITUTE,
http://www.workplacebullying.org/faq.html (defining bullying as “a laser-focused,
systematic campaign of interpersonal destruction” by a bully against a victim that “has
nothing to do with work itself”).
281. Parkes, supra note 225, at 450.
282. On the other hand, even school bullying is now considered by some to be a serious
threat as the cause of a number of teenage suicides. See, e.g., Emily Bazelon, What Really
Happened to Phoebe Prince?, SLATE (July 20, 2010), http://www.slate.com/id/2260952/
entry/2260953 (providing a complicated account of a high-school student’s suicide, by
contrast to the public’s rush to deem the cause of the tragedy to be simple “bullying”).
283. See Loraleigh Keashly & Karen Jagatic, By Any Other Name: American
Perspectives on Workplace Bullying, in BULLYING AND EMOTIONAL ABUSE IN THE
WORKPLACE 31, 31–33 (Ståle Einarsen et al. eds., 2003).
284. Mobbing may also invoke the lynch mob—helpful if one sees the harm of
workplace bullying as severe, but insulting if one sees the comparison to race-motivated
murder as trivializing. See Coleman, supra note 8, at 54–55 (making the comparison to a
lynch mob).
285. See Abrams, supra note 254, at 1184–85 & n.92.
286. See Coleman, supra note 8, 57–58 (“Perhaps unsurprisingly, the concept [of
mobbing] struggles against an accusation of triviality—as most of us routinely endure
varieties of social aggression or insult, of course, and it is sometimes difficult to discern
when inevitable workplace conflicts reach the level of psychological destruction needed to
qualify as mobbing.”).
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differences may be at work. Americans seem to care more about inequality than
indignity. To Americans, the concept of dignity seems vague and subjective.287 For
example, as one Swedish individual said of mobbing: “‘If everybody else leaves the
coffee room when you walk in, that’s a violation of your dignity, and the law
should do something about it.’”288 To thick-skinned Americans, this sounds
ridiculous.289 Of course, an isolated incident of this sort would not be actionable
under the Healthy Workplace Bill,290 but the risk of frivolous lawsuits or legal
threats could undermine public support for the law.291
Remedial efforts may be diluted:
This is not simply an abstract point but an issue with ramifications for
public education, legal enforcement, and private efforts at prevention.
The public will better understand the need for concerted enforcement
efforts, and employers will better comprehend the need for strong
affirmative obligations of prevention and response, if they understand
that they are remedying a longstanding, often entrenched problem [such
as gender discrimination].292
Dilution is a problem that can be limited through statutory design. For example, the
Healthy Workplace Bill would not involve state administrative agencies in deciding
claims and, therefore, would not strain existing state agencies.293 However, the new
cause of action would increase the caseload of courts and the workload of state

287. See Friedman & Whitman, supra note 64, at 267–68 (explaining that “[t]he
continental countries are places where high-status persons used to lord it over their inferiors
in insulting and degrading ways,” giving rise to the European principle of dignity for all
workers, while U.S. law is driven by a different “evil of the past”—slavery—and so, in the
U.S., the “task of the law is to end discrimination for particular historically disfavored
groups, not to ensure respect for everybody”).
288. Id. at 264 (emphasis in original) (quoting Interview with Jonas Alberg,
Arbetslivsinstitutet, Stockholm).
289. See, e.g., Dinkins v. Charoen Pokphand USA, Inc., 133 F. Supp. 2d 1237, 1250
(M.D. Ala. 2001) (“[I]n our pluralist society, no employee can expect the rough and tumble
professional world to completely accommodate his or her private sense of decency, civility,
and morality.”).
290. Even in Sweden, this type of behavior would probably not qualify as mobbing
unless it was repeated. Sweden’s Ordinance on Victimization at Work defines
“victimization” as “recurrent reprehensible or distinctly negative actions which are directed
against individual employees.” 1 § ORDINANCE OF THE SWEDISH NATIONAL BOARD OF
OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH CONTAINING PROVISIONS ON MEASURES AGAINST
VICTIMIZATION AT WORK (Statute Book of the Swedish National Board of Occupational
Safety and Health [AFS] 1993:17) (Swed.). It does not create a cause of action for aggrieved
employees; rather, it imposes administrative obligations on employers to prevent harassment.
Id. § 4.
291. One scholar argues that an anti-bullying statute has the potential to “weaken[] the
entire field” of antidiscrimination law. Corbett, supra note 8, at 144.
292. Abrams, supra note 254, at 1187.
293. Yamada, Crafting, supra note 60, at 504–05.
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agencies called upon to issue guidances to interpret the new statute. Public
education and employer initiatives could also be diluted.294
Anti-bullying rules may also risk watering down sexual harassment doctrine.
This depends on how the harms are conceptualized. There could be three ways to
conceptualize the overlap in definitions between bullying and hostile environment
sexual harassment. The first conception would be that all dignitary harms are
coterminous with gender discrimination.295 A second view is that gender
discrimination is a subset of bullying.296 This view could be the basis for a “hate
bullying” paradigm in which sexual harassment would be considered a more
offensive class of bullying.297 A third view is that the phenomena may have a
segment of overlap but certain distinct features.
Even if the paradigm is the third view, principles developed in mobbing law
may drift into sexual harassment law, and vice versa, until the result is the first
view—that sexual harassment melts into bullying.298 Anti-bullying rules are
generally less restrictive than sexual harassment rules. First, in Europe, bullying
must be repeated and take place over a long period of time, while sexual
harassment may be isolated.299 In the United States, a hostile work environment

294. Employers might add anti-bullying training to the now ubiquitous sexual harassment
trainings, but the efficacy of such sessions is unproven in any event. See THERESA M.
BEINER, GENDER MYTHS V. WORKING REALITIES: USING SOCIAL SCIENCE TO REFORMULATE
SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW 155–57 (2005); Susan Bisom-Rapp, Fixing Watches with
Sledgehammers: The Questionable Embrace of Employee Sexual Harassment Training by
the Legal Profession, 24 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 147 (2001).
295. Although this conception is not expressly advocated by any scholars, some come
very close in describing the gendered origins of bullying: bullying is aggression, aggression
is masculine, and therefore bullying is gendered. See, e.g., McGinley, supra note 32, at 1232.
296. See Ehrenreich, supra note 8, at 63 (suggesting this diagram).
297. Yamada, Phenomenon, supra note 60, at 530; see also Ehrenreich, supra note 8, at
54–55; id. at 39–44, 54 (arguing that, in some tort cases, courts treated the discriminatory
context “as an exacerbating factor when assessing the severity of workplace harassment of
women”). But see Parkes, supra note 225, at 453 n.127 (concluding that such proposals
would “not resolve the concern that the systemic factors that contribute to workplace
harassment will go unaddressed”).
298. For example, when France enacted its moral harassment law, it also amended its
sexual harassment law in the interest of consistency. Abigail C. Saguy, International
Crossways: Traffic in Sexual Harassment Policy, 9 EUR. J. WOMEN’S STUD. 249, 264 (2002).
That amendment expanded the definition of sexual harassment to include harassment by
coworkers as well as superiors. Id. Although in the French case, the drift resulted in more
expansive protections, there is a risk of contracted protections as well. Note that France is a
civil law country; the development of civil law may not parallel the evolution of common
law.
299. See Lorho & Hilp, supra note 69, at 9–10. The Healthy Workplace Act would limit
actionable isolated conduct to an “especially severe and egregious act.” Yamada, Crafting,
supra note 60, at 498. Similarly, Quebec’s law proscribes “[a] single serious incidence of
such behaviour that has a lasting harmful effect on an employee.” Act Respecting Labour
Standards, R.S.Q. 2002, c. N-1.1, ch. IV, div. V.2, § 81.18 ¶ 2 (Que., Can.),
http://www.canlii.org/en/qc/laws/stat/rsq-c-n-1.1/84271/rsq-c-n-1.1.html#history.
The
harmful effect of the incidence “must be felt over time.” COMMISSION DES NORMES DU
TRAVAIL, INTERPRETATION OF THE ACT RESPECTING LABOUR STANDARDS, ITS REGULATIONS
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may be “severe or pervasive.”300 Second, the Healthy Workplace Act requires that
the victim prove the aggressor had a mental state of “malice,”301 whereas
harassment law requires only a showing that the harassment was because of sex or
another protected characteristic.302 Third, the damages available to a mobbing
victim would be more limited than those available under Title VII.303 And finally,
bullying policies are more likely to give victims options of in-house grievance
procedures, mediation, or arbitration, rather than access to courts. Should these
limitations drift from bullying law into Title VII harassment law, antidiscrimination
protections would be watered down. Due to the antipathy of the judiciary and
business community toward workplace regulations, I predict it is more likely that
Title VII harassment rules will be watered down than that bullying rules will be
strengthened.
***
In sum, although there is not yet enough empirical research on these questions to
reach firm conclusions, the available scholarship suggests that anti-bullying rules
would not have significant advantages over sexual harassment prohibitions in terms
of avoiding essentialism or backlash. And anti-bullying rules are likely to impede
antidiscrimination goals by obscuring the connections between harassment and
patterns of subordination, and diluting the scope of harassment prohibitions.
B. Work-Life Accommodations
1. Essentialism: Defining the Balanced Worker
a. Moving Away from Family
Work-life policy has advantages over work-family policy in avoiding
essentialism. Balancing the work-family equation is the new feminine mystique.304
AND THE NATIONAL HOLIDAY ACT 66 (2010),

available at http://www.cnt.gouv.qc.ca/
fileadmin/pdf/publications/c_0111_a.pdf.
300. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 786 (1998) (emphasis added)
(quoting Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986)). Careful drafting could avoid
this problem. For example, one state agency defines mobbing as persistent behavior while
clarifying that an isolated incident may constitute harassment. STATE OF OR. DEP’T OF
ENVTL. QUALITY, supra note 78 (“Mobbing is persistent and systematic harassment and does
not include isolated incidents or appropriate corrective measures which may be covered in
other policies. For example, a single use of an offensive comment is unacceptable and may
be a violation of the harassment-free workplace policy, but a single offensive comment is not
mobbing.”).
301. Yamada, Crafting, supra note 60, at 501.
302. See id. at 497.
303. Compare id. at 504 (proposing a bill that would provide that where an employer’s
conduct “did not culminate in a negative employment decision, its liability for damages for
emotional distress shall not exceed $25,000, and it shall not be subject to punitive
damages”), with 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1) (2006) (authorizing compensatory damages and
punitive damages without limits in cases of intentional discrimination under Title VII).
304. See Moran, supra note 98, at 288 (implying that the “work-family” rubric suggests
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Finding the optimal arrangement—just the right amount of work and just the right
amount of family—has become the successful woman’s imperative.305 Stay-athome moms are blamed for women’s inequality in paid labor, while workaholic
women are told their lives are meaningless without children.306 Although it is
gender neutral, the unstated premise of the “work-family accommodation model” is
that work should be more flexible so that we women can “balance paid work with
‘our’ family responsibilities.”307 The paradigmatic beneficiary of this policy is the
harried mother working the second shift who “talk[s] about sleep the way a hungry
person talks about food.”308
Work-life policy may better avoid such gender stereotypes. Universal protection
would reflect that inflexible workplaces are not problematic just for women or
parents, but rather are harmful to everyone.309 Making flexible arrangements
available to all workers does not require employers or the judiciary to determine
whether workers have legitimate family relationships or caretaking needs.310 Worklife policies avoid generalizations about any particular person’s life goals or the
form “family” should take. Workers would be able to shape their careers to
accommodate any variety of life pursuits: caretaking, military service, volunteering,
education, or watching reality television shows.311 Work-life policies do not
privilege motherhood, parenting, or family over other life pursuits.
Despite these advantages, work-life policies continue to exclude many workers
and invite new forms of essentialism.
b. Those Left Out by Work-Life Balance
The work-life mantra is not all-inclusive. The work-life concept re-centers
workplace norms around those who desire balance between at-work and after-work
activities, potentially to the detriment of those for whom work is life (i.e.,
the goal is for “women to follow a script of combining work and family”).
305. Single women without children are rendered invisible by this norm, id., while
mothers who have “too many” children become spectacles, see Jessica Grose, Extreme
Moms and Why We Love Them: Our National Obsession with Kate Gosselin, Michelle
Duggar, and Octomom, DOUBLEX.COM (Nov. 24, 2009), http://www.doublex.com/section/
arts/extreme-moms-and-why-we-love-them.
306. See generally Joan Williams, “It’s Snowing Down South”: How to Help Mothers
and Avoid Recycling the Sameness/Difference Debate, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 812 (2002).
307. Schultz, supra note 9, at 1954–55.
308. ARLIE RUSSELL HOCHSCHILD, THE SECOND SHIFT 10 (rev. ed. 2003).
309. See Ryan & Kossek, supra note 128, at 298.
310. Ellen Ernst Kossek & Brian Distelberg, Work and Family Employment Policy for a
Transformed Labor Force: Current Trends and Themes, in WORK-LIFE POLICIES, supra note
9, at 3, 34 (“Some of the most effective companies define work and family issues broadly, as
this helps them develop a performance, rather than a police, culture on monitoring access to
flexibility and other supports.”).
311. I mean this only partly in jest. According to proponents of work-life policies, the
prototypical worker is interested in time off for enriching pursuits such as religious study,
caregiving, physical fitness, or emergency-preparedness training. But Americans over age
fifteen spend half of their leisure time watching television. News Release, U.S. Dep’t of
Labor, American Time Use Surveys—2009 Results 2 (June 22, 2010),
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/atus.pdf.
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“workaholics”), and those for whom life is work (i.e., the prototypical
overstretched woman in the “sandwich generation” caring for both elderly parents
and young children). Generation X workers may be more concerned about worklife balance than baby boomers.312 And some members of the next generation of
workers want to deconstruct the divide between work and life.313 The “work-life
balance” metaphor suggests that every individual must work to maintain the two
separate and opposing spheres at equilibrium, rather than finding overlaps and
synergies between roles.314
Policies that allow workers to spend less time in the workplace in exchange for
lower wages are helpful only to high earners,315 who are more likely to be white
and male. Those who need more wage work to support themselves and their
families have little use for such work-life accommodations. For example, one
work-life accommodation for retail workers allows them to “claim availability” by
declaring the times they can work.316 But in doing so, they risk receiving fewer
hours.317 These workers are forced into the choice between “working preferred
hours” and “working enough hours.”318
And although “flexibility” may be good for high-income workers when it is a
perk intended to improve recruiting, retention, and productivity, “flexibility” has an
entirely different meaning for low-income workers.319 Many low-wage workers
need the opposite of flexibility—they need predictable schedules, rather than
schedules given on little notice, so they can make arrangements for childcare and

312. CATALYST, THE NEXT GENERATION: TODAY’S PROFESSIONALS, TOMORROW’S
LEADERS 2–3 (2001); FAMILIES & WORK INST., GENERATION AND GENDER IN THE
WORKPLACE 3 (2004), available at www.familiesandwork.org/site/research/reports/genand
gender.pdf; see also Ellen Galinsky, Work-Life Policies: A “Both/And” Approach, in WORKLIFE POLICIES, supra note 9, at 289, 304.
313. See Forum: Men and Marriage (C-SPAN2 television broadcast Oct. 19, 2009),
available at http://www.c-spanarchives.org/program/id/214130 (held by the Center for
American Progress) (statement of Courtney Martin, at 19:02) (“In my generation . . . this
kind of work slash life language doesn’t even make sense, because we want our work to be
part of our lives and we want our lives to work.”). See generally ARLIE RUSSELL
HOCHSCHILD, THE TIME BIND: WHEN WORK BECOMES HOME AND HOME BECOMES WORK
(1997).
314. Diane F. Halpern & Susan Elaine Murphy, From Balance to Interaction: Why the
Metaphor Is Important, in FROM WORK-FAMILY BALANCE TO WORK-FAMILY INTERACTION:
CHANGING THE METAPHOR 3, 3 (Diane F. Halpern & Susan Elaine Murphy eds., 2005) (“The
message in this balance metaphor is clear—spend too much time at work and your family
will suffer and vice versa. . . . These metaphors are not only anxiety provoking; the message
that they send is wrong. Work and family are not a zero-sum game.”).
315. See Selmi & Cahn, supra note 88, at 8.
316. Susan J. Lambert, Making a Difference for Hourly Employees, in WORK-LIFE
POLICIES, supra note 9, at 169, 177.
317. Id.
318. Id.
319. See Kerry Rittich, Rights, Risk, and Reward: Governance Norms in the
International Order and the Problem of Precarious Work, in PRECARIOUS WORK, WOMEN,
AND THE NEW ECONOMY, supra note 12, at 31, 31; Schultz, supra note 16, at 1220–21.
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other plans.320 Telecommuting is touted as a work-life solution, but there are two
tracks of telecommuters: (1) predominantly male elite professionals for whom
telecommuting is “a benefit that gives workers increased choice, flexibility, and
autonomy,” and (2) predominantly female clerical workers for whom
telecommuting “result[s] in decreased pay, benefits, autonomy, job security, and
advancement opportunities.”321
The international experience suggests that work-life solutions are often enacted
with compromises that disadvantage the economically powerless. For example,
when France implemented a thirty-five-hour workweek, working-class and
immigrant women benefited the least from the law, because companies demanded
larger tradeoffs for the reform in terms of being able to choose work hours and
restrain wages.322 Some workers were required to work “yo-yo shift patterns” in
which “[s]hifts were shortened but multiplied so that working patterns fitted in with
management ideologies of permanent availability while workers hung around in
between shifts.”323
c. The Employer Discretion Double Bind
Work-life reformers face a double bind. To best avoid essentialism, every
worker must be able to customize his or her job. Some psychologists define an
“inclusive workplace” as one that “values individual and intergroup differences in
the primacy of work versus other life roles” and “supports variation in domestic
backgrounds and in blending work and nonwork demands.”324
It is one that equally values those who believe leaving work early to
attend a child’s soccer game is critical as well as those who do not mind
missing games, and for those who use all their available paid time off to
train for a triathlon as well as those who feel personal time is reserved
for family emergencies.325
For these psychologists, every worker should be able to negotiate the shape of his
or her career.
But U.S. workplaces are not structured to allow radical customization.
Customization of jobs is at the discretion of the employer. And the more an
employer has discretion to approve or deny flexible work arrangements, the more
opportunities for essentialism, as each supervisor brings his or her own views on
the normative case for accommodation.326 When mothers want to work from home,

320. Lambert, supra note 316, at 190.
321. Michelle A. Travis, Equality in the Virtual Workplace, 24 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB.
L. 283, 285 (2003).
322. GILL ALLWOOD & KHURSHEED WADIA, GENDER AND POLICY IN FRANCE 55 (2009).
However, professional women reported improvements. See Schultz & Hoffman, supra note
12, at 146.
323. ALLWOOD & WADIA, supra note 322, at 55.
324. Ryan & Kossek, supra note 128, at 296.
325. Id.
326. See Tristin K. Green, Discrimination in Workplace Dynamics: Toward a Structural
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supervisors may deny the request based on the stereotype that working mothers are
likely to be distracted by their children.327 On the other hand, supervisors are more
likely to agree to reductions in work hours for female than for male employees,
perhaps based on stereotypical assumptions that women should engage in more
caretaking.328 Other supervisors may be more willing to support traditional
families, defined to exclude those with elder care responsibilities, single people, or
same-sex couples. If only mothers or childcare needs are accommodated, the
transition from “work-family” to “work-life” is simply a change in labels rather
than the loosening of essentialist ideas.329
2. Backlash: Creating a New “Mommy Track”
Work-life accommodations used by all workers may appear to avoid identity
politics—benefiting men, women, parents, and nonparents alike—without
stigmatizing their beneficiaries.330 Some experience bears this out. Best Buy’s
corporate headquarters implemented a successful program called “results-only
work environment,” or “ROWE,”331 to get rid of fixed hours for all employees,
Account of Disparate Treatment Theory, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 91, 108–11 (2003). In
the alternative, a legal regime could provide a detailed list of all the activities for which
leave should be required (i.e., breastfeeding, school plays, children’s sporting events, etc.).
Cf. Arnow-Richman, supra note 9, at 1090–91 (describing the “incredible breadth and
detail” of the recent Military Leave Amendments to the FMLA which “require employers to
provide FMLA leave to employees experiencing a ‘qualifying exigency’ as a result of a
family member serving or called to active duty in the Armed Forces”). But such a list would
reflect essentialist notions of the core activities of caretaking. Moreover, “it is unclear how
law makers would extend laws like school involvement legislation to provide workers with
the requisite flexibility to accommodate all of the particular needs of their families without
creating a highly complex and unwieldy system of rules.” Id.
327. Arnow-Richman, supra note 9, at 1104. Although, in theory, such a failure to
accommodate would be actionable discrimination, it would be difficult to prove that the
action was motivated by bias rather than a legitimate business justification, particularly if the
supervisor’s prejudices were implicit or unconscious. Id. at 1104–05. Arnow-Richman
argues that a law giving employees the right to request accommodations would temper
subconscious bias by requiring the employer to focus on relevant business considerations
and meet with the requesting employee. Id. at 1111–12. But Arnow-Richman admits that her
assessment is “highly optimistic.” Id. at 1112–13.
328. Ryan & Kossek, supra note 128, at 301 (citing Lisa Barham, Benjamin H. Gottlieb
& E. Kevin Kelloway, Variables Affecting Managers’ Willingness to Grant Alternative Work
Arrangements, 138 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 291 (1998)).
329. See Janet Smithson & Elizabeth H. Stokoe, Discourses of Work-Life Balance:
Negotiating ‘Genderblind’ Terms in Organizations, 12 GENDER, WORK & ORG. 147, 164
(2005) (conducting qualitative analysis of survey responses from employees of UK firms and
finding that “de-gendered terms [like work-life] do not in practice change the widespread
assumption within organizations by managers and employees, both women and men, that
these issues are strongly linked to women”).
330. Case, supra note 9, at 1768 (arguing that proposing flexible work arrangements
available to parents and nonparents alike “would broaden the coalition for such change and
potentially reduce the possibility for zero-sum games among employees”).
331. Phyllis Moen, Erin Kelly & Kelly Chermack, Learning from a Natural Experiment:
Studying a Corporate Work-Time Policy Initiative, in WORK-LIFE POLICIES, supra note 9, at
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“replacing institutionalized clockworks with an emphasis on the quality of job
done.”332 The program’s creators considered it essential to their success that they
deliberately avoided any reference to their project as “work-family,” “‘mother’
friendly or even ‘family’ friendly.”333 Similarly, many medical practices have been
able to provide flexible work arrangements by framing the initiative as a set of
“broad developments that address a wider range of worker and organizational needs
beyond those linked to family.”334 A historical example: by expanding the FMLA
from family leave to medical leave, supporters were able to increase the policy’s
appeal across the political spectrum and achieve passage of the bill.335 There seems
to be more support for the argument that universalism avoids backlash in the worklife context than in the harassment context.
But in many workplaces, even universally available flexible work arrangements
and leave policies are regarded as special accommodations for caretakers or
“mommy tracks.”336 Although both men and women express concern about worklife issues, flexibility remains seen as a “women’s issue.”337 Employees,
particularly men, fear that using flexible arrangements will signal that they lack
commitment to the job and hinder their career advancement.338 A study of the
medical profession found that increased flexibility goes hand-in-hand with
increased bureaucratization.339 This is because the larger the practice and the more
standardized the procedures, the less any one physician is viewed as
indispensable.340 Women and parents are more likely to work in such practices, but
at the cost of autonomy, prestige, and income.341 This caused one researcher to ask,
“Does gaining flexibility mean losing the professional ‘calling’?”342
One way to avoid the “mommy track” problem is to mandate work-life balance
for everyone. An example: to increase gender parity, many scholars advocate
mandatory paid maternity and paternity leave.343 Another example: some
97, 103.
332. Id. at 101.
333. Id. at 106.
334. See Forrest Briscoe, The Design of Work as a Key Driver of Work-Life Flexibility
for Professionals, in WORK-LIFE POLICIES, supra note 9, at 83, 89–91.
335. See STEVEN K. WISENSALE, FAMILY LEAVE POLICY: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
WORK AND FAMILY IN AMERICA 150 (2001).
336. See JACOBS & GERSON, supra note 127, at 111 (“‘Mommy tracks’ . . . ask women to
forgo upward mobility in order to combine motherhood and work. . . . ‘Gender neutral’
family policies may appear less pernicious. But if they stigmatize parental involvement, both
involved mothers and fathers are disadvantaged.” (emphasis in original)); Kelly & Moen,
supra note 126; Schultz, supra note 9, at 1955–56.
337. CATALYST, WOMEN AND MEN IN U.S. CORPORATE LEADERSHIP: SAME WORKPLACE,
DIFFERENT REALITIES 29–30 (2004) (studying Fortune 1000 executives directly below the
CEO level); Gerkovich, supra note 123, at 276.
338. See Kelly & Moen, supra note 126, at 490 (summarizing research).
339. See Briscoe, supra note 334, at 86–87.
340. Id.
341. Id. See generally CYNTHIA FUCHS EPSTEIN, CARROLL SERON, BONNIE OGLENSKY &
ROBERT SAUTÉ, THE PART-TIME PARADOX: TIME NORMS, PROFESSIONAL LIVES, FAMILY, AND
GENDER (1999) (describing this phenomenon in law firms).
342. Briscoe, supra note 334, at 89.
343. See, e.g., Samuel L. Bray, Power Rules, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1172, 1180 (2010);
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employers, rather than giving religious employees the Sabbath off, close up shop
for all workers.344 But still, the focus is on accommodating parents or religious
preferences. And while these solutions may work for homogenous workforces (all
young parents, all members of certain religions), they will not work as well for
heterogeneous workforces consisting of people with varying caregiving
responsibilities, religious orientations, and other extracurricular needs and
interests.345
Universal workplace accommodations may be just as likely as caretaking
accommodations to shift costs onto disadvantaged groups. Research suggests that
managers and coworkers assume that the users of flexible work arrangements are a
drain on productivity, whether or not they really are.346 If men as well as women
began taking advantage of work-life policies, it might stem cost shifting in the form
of hiring discrimination against women. But to the extent that only women use
workplace accommodations, the costs of absences are likely to be shifted onto other
women.347 Because many workplaces are segregated, with certain employers hiring
almost all women,348 women are likely to bear any costs of maternity leave or other
employer-funded mandates targeted at women.349 And regardless of what group the
Suk, supra note 114, at 68 (“[M]andatory paternity leave may enable fathers to resist
employer pressures to continue working, even when they want to stay home to care for a
young child.”). But see Selmi, supra note 100, at 774 (arguing that “[d]espite its possible
success, the objections to a mandatory paternity leave policy would almost certainly block its
implementation”). Examples of possible objections include the infringement on the liberty of
both parents and questions about whether the policy would apply to fathers who are not
married to or living with the mother. Id. Sweden employs a “use-it-or-lose-it” model for
fathers, in which both parents are allocated thirteen total months of paid leave, but at least
two of those months can only be used by fathers. Katrin Bennhold, In Sweden, Men Can
Have It All, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 2010, at A6; see also Arielle Horman Grill, Comment, The
Myth of Unpaid Family Leave: Can the United States Implement a Paid Leave Policy Based
on the Swedish Model?, 17 COMP. LAB. L.J. 373, 375 (1996).
344. See, e.g., Adam Goldman, Ultra-Orthodox Jews Hit It Big with Cameras,
CHARLESTON GAZETTE & DAILY MAIL, Dec. 1, 2005, at 13A (“[B&H Photo-Video] employs
800 to 900 people, many of them religious Jews. The store closes each Friday afternoon until
Sunday in observance of the Sabbath, and on about a half-dozen Jewish holidays each
year.”); Why We’re Closed on Sundays, CHICK-FIL-A, http://www.chick-fila.com/Company/Highlights-Sunday (“Our founder, Truett Cathy, made the decision to close
on Sundays in 1946 . . . . He believes that all franchised Chick-fil-A Operators and
Restaurant employees should have an opportunity to rest, spend time with family and
friends, and worship if they choose to do so.”).
345. A prejudiced employer could exploit preferences for such schedules for
discriminatory purposes. See Jonah Gelbach, Jonathan Klick & Lesley Wexler, Passive
Discrimination: When Does It Make Sense to Pay Too Little?, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 797
(2009).
346. See Ellen Ernst Kossek, Alison E. Barber & Deborah Winters, Using Flexible
Schedules in the Managerial World: The Power of Peers, 38 HUM. RESOURCE MGMT. 33, 40
(1999) (surveying managers, and concluding that “productivity concerns are most strongly
associated with use of flextime; slightly, but significantly related to use of leaves; and not
related to use of part time work”).
347. Case, supra note 9, at 1756.
348. See Boushey, supra note 23, at 39–40.
349. Case, supra note 9, at 1757 (“[I]n female-dominated jobs, like those so many
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mandate is targeted at, “[e]mployers may shift costs disproportionately to
secondary labor market workers (those who are easily replaceable because their
human capital is basically irrelevant) in an effort to avoid cutting compensation of
incumbent primary employees (those whose human capital is necessary to their
job).”350
In a heterogeneous workforce, work-life policies can be polarizing when one
worker’s life conflicts with another’s. When flexibility is conceptualized as
accommodation, it comes to be seen as “a favor or a perk” rather than a “mutual
benefit.”351 What if Jane wants the afternoon off to volunteer to plant trees, while
John wants to leave early for his daughter’s soccer practice? “Work/family issues
are inevitably personal: people feel as if they are defending their own life choices in
a context where no one feels entirely comfortable because everyone is caught in the
clash of social ideals.”352 Managers may seem to apply different standards, causing
a perception that the organization is unjust.353 Some advocates claim that jealousy
and backlash can be avoided if managers communicate and apply objective
parameters for use of work-life policies.354 But the more rigid the parameters, the
less likely the policies are to meet the needs of a diverse workforce. And employers
are hesitant to adopt formal policies for fear of creating legal “entitlements.”355
3. Assimilation: Increasing the Gendered Division of Labor
The critique of assimilationist reform strategies has the most force in the worklife context.356 Work-life balance problems are not gender neutral. Women do the

women occupy, ‘the existing employees’ on whom the ‘excess work’ resulting from
schedules favoring mothers on the job is ‘dump[ed]’ are other women, most likely women
without children.”); Jolls, supra note 44, at 284 (“[R]estrictions on wage differentials
frequently will not bind for female workers, as a result of occupational segregation, and,
thus, that accommodation mandates targeted to female workers will be likely to be financed
by those same workers primarily in the form of lower wages.”).
350. Gillian Lester, A Defense of Paid Family Leave, 28 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 1, 59
n.240 (2005) (citations omitted).
351. Galinsky, supra note 312, at 301.
352. Joan C. Williams, Keynote Address: Want Gender Equality? Die Childless at Thirty,
27 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 3, 7 (2006). But see JACOBS & GERSON, supra note 127, at 199
(concluding that the “child free” backlash against workplace entitlements for parents is not a
strong force); Robert Drago, David Costanza, Robert Caplan, Tanya Brubaker, Darnell
Cloud, Naomi Harris, Russell Kashian & T. Lynn Riggs, The Willingness-to-Pay for
Work/Family Policies: A Study of Teachers, 55 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 22 (2001) (similar).
353. See Kelly & Moen, supra note 126, at 490.
354. Ryan & Kossek, supra note 128, at 299–300 (arguing that supervisors can avoid
“backlash and jealousy in coworker relations” by implementing measures to avoid conflicts,
such as “cross-training, setting core hours, and modes for communication and back-up
systems when people are flexing”).
355. Erin L. Kelly & Alexandra Kalev, Managing Flexible Work Arrangements in US
Organizations: Formalized Discretion or ‘A Right to Ask,’ 4 SOCIO-ECON. REV. 379, 382,
394 (2006).
356. See JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER: WHY FAMILY AND WORK CONFLICT AND
WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 4–8 (2000).

1274

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 86:1219

lion’s share of caregiving, and they are penalized for it in the labor market.357 In
contrast to policies that encourage caregiving, policies that accommodate all life
pursuits equally will confer the greatest advantage in labor markets on workers
with no domestic responsibilities, in other words, those who assimilate to
traditional male norms. Under open-ended rules, women will have incentives to
take leave to better engage in caregiving, while men will have incentives to use
flexible work arrangements to better engage in paid work. The result is to
legitimate the gendered division of labor.
a. Constrained Choices
Work-life accommodations are premised on a universalistic liberty ideal:
employers should respect all workers’ choices in how to combine life and paid
work. But for good reasons, feminists have criticized recent generations of
scholarship for fetishizing choice.358 As Vicki Schultz has put it: “workplace
flexibility programs and their advocates assume that the rhythms and dynamics of
family life, and any patterns of sex segregation that are associated with flexible
work options, are exogenous to workplace arrangements.”359 Workers are not
radically free to make choices, such as whether to stay home with children or seek
employment,360 whether to work as nurses or plumbers,361 or whether to dress
demurely or provocatively on the job.362 Such choices are constrained and
sometimes wholly determined by the options available in the home and workplace.
The very fact that workers face such choices is not a natural feature of the social
landscape, but rather a situation that has resulted from the intersection of gender
norms with legal, political, and economic structures. For example, the so-called
“opt-out revolution”363 of professional women leaving their jobs to stay home with
children was more about mothers being pushed out of inflexible workplaces than
about mothers being pulled back home by biological urges (to the extent any such
trend existed).364 Likewise, men do not avoid housework and childcare due to

357. See id. at 2; supra note 102.
358. See Naomi Cahn & June Carbone, Lifting the Floor: Sex, Class, and Education, 39
U. BALT. L.F. 57, 58 (2008); Tracy E. Higgins, Why Feminists Can’t (or Shouldn’t) Be
Liberals, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 1629, 1632–33 (2004).
359. Schultz, supra note 16, at 1216 (emphasis in original).
360. Cf. Amy L. Wax, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Market: Is There a Future for
Egalitarian Marriage?, 84 VA. L. REV. 509, 513 (1998).
361. See Vicki Schultz, Telling Stories About Women and Work: Judicial Interpretations
of Sex Segregation in the Workplace in Title VII Cases Raising the Lack of Interest
Argument, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1749, 1840–43 (1990).
362. See Rhode, supra note 55, at 1058–59.
363. Lisa Belkin, The Opt-Out Revolution, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Oct. 26, 2003, at 42.
Empirical support for any “opt-out” trend is lacking. See Heather Boushey, “Opting Out?”
The Effect of Children on Women’s Employment in the United States, 14 FEMINIST ECON. 1,
30–31 (2008) (concluding that changes in the effect of having a child on women’s
employment between 2000 and 2005 were not statistically significant, and recent declines in
women’s employment are more likely an effect of the weak labor market for all women).
364. PAMELA STONE, OPTING OUT? WHY WOMEN REALLY QUIT CAREERS AND HEAD
HOME (2007); JOAN C. WILLIAMS, JESSICA MANVELL & STEPHANIE BORNSTEIN, CTR. FOR
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intractable biological inclinations—between 1975 and 1998, men’s unpaid work
increased by an hour a day.365
b. Flexibility for Men; Leave for Women
Women have fewer choices in work scheduling than men. Women are less likely
than men to have access to flexible work schedules, even in the same industries.366
Research suggests this is likely because women hold fewer elite positions.367 Many
organizations have formal policies referring to “legal ideals of fairness and
consistency,” and supervisors look to these policies when granting requests for
flexible work arrangements.368 But those policies are written to safeguard
managerial discretion “and avoid creating ‘new entitlements.’”369 In practice,
managers offer flexible work arrangements to reward those employees viewed as
good performers—employees with bargaining power in the labor market who
might find new jobs if not accommodated.370 “Ethnic and racial minorities, and
women, especially mothers, may find it more difficult to be recognized as a ‘high
performer’” in this system.371 However, women are more likely to have access to

WORKLIFE LAW, “OPT OUT” OR PUSHED OUT?: HOW THE PRESS COVERS WORK/FAMILY
CONFLICT: THE UNTOLD STORY OF WHY WOMEN LEAVE THE WORKFORCE (2006), available
at http://www.worklifelaw.org/pubs/OptOutPushedOut.pdf; Catherine Albiston, AntiEssentialism and the Work/Family Dilemma, 20 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 30, 42–47
(2005).
365. Linda C. Sayer, Gender, Time, and Inequality: Trends in Women’s and Men’s Paid
Work, Unpaid Work and Free Time, 84 SOC. FORCES 285, 297 (2005) (analyzing nationally
representative time-diary data from 1975 and 1998). Women still do more total combined
paid and unpaid work, leaving a thirty-minute-per-day leisure gap. Id. at 296; see also
Melissa A. Milkie, Sara B. Raley & Suzanne M. Bianchi, Taking on the Second Shift: Time
Allocations and Time Pressures of U.S. Parents with Preschoolers, 88 SOC. FORCES 487,
507–08 (2009) (analyzing two nationally representative samples of U.S. parents with
preschoolers, and concluding that women working full-time and married to a husband
working full-time worked an extra week-and-a-half a year compared to similar men).
366. Lonnie Golden, Limited Access: Disparities in Flexible Work Schedules and Workat-Home, 29 J. FAM. & ECON. ISSUES 86, 104 (2008); see also Elaine McCrate, Flexible
Hours, Workplace Authority, and Compensating Wage Differentials in the US, 11 FEMINIST
ECON. 11 (2005); Deanna L. Sharpe, Joan M. Hermsen & Jodi Billings, Factors Associated
with Having Flextime: A Focus on Married Workers, 23 J. FAM. & ECON. ISSUES 51 (2002);
Jennifer E. Swanberg, Marcie Pitt-Catsouphes & Krista Drescher-Burke, A Question of
Justice: Disparities in Employees’ Access to Flexible Schedule Arrangements, 26 J. FAM.
ISSUES 866 (2005).
367. EEOC, GLASS CEILINGS: THE STATUS OF WOMEN AS OFFICIALS AND MANAGERS IN
THE PRIVATE SECTOR (Mar. 4, 2004), http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/reports/glass
ceiling/index.html (concluding, based on 2002 data, that women were 48% of the workforce
but only 36.4% of managers or officials); Kim A. Weeden, Is There a Flexiglass Ceiling?
Flexible Work Arrangements and Wages in the United States, 34 SOC. SCI. RES. 454, 455–56
(2005).
368. Kelly & Kalev, supra note 355, at 382, 394.
369. Id. at 394.
370. Id. at 402–04.
371. Id. at 407.
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one type of flexible work arrangement—work-at-home arrangements372—perhaps
because such arrangements facilitate their increased caregiving relative to men.373
By failing to connect the problems that workers have in integrating work and
life with larger patterns of gender subordination, work-life policies fail to address
inequality. One problem is that men don’t take leave as often as women.374
Research suggests men want to take leave, but the economic incentives are stacked
against it, since men are likely to earn higher wages than their female partners.375
Additionally, in many workplaces, men are explicitly or implicitly discouraged
from taking leave.376 The effect of women’s disproportionate use of leave is to
reinforce labor specialization—women develop better caretaking skills and lose
ground in paid labor markets during their time off, while men fail to develop
caretaking skills and gain ground in paid labor markets.377
And when men do use work-life accommodations, it does not necessarily
decrease women’s caretaking burdens. Men are more likely to use flexible work
scheduling so that they can work when they are most productive, while women are
more likely to use flexible work scheduling to accommodate caretaking.378 When
France implemented a thirty-five-hour workweek, the number of men with two jobs
increased.379 Joan Williams offers the anecdote that when a law school where she
worked in the 1980s gave mothers and fathers a semester’s leave for the birth of a
child, “Women used the leave for child care, while one man went to Mardi Gras
during his leave (without the baby) and another used his leave to write a law review

372. Golden, supra note 366, at 105.
373. Employers may also be more likely to grant reduced work hours to women, as
opposed to flexible work hours. See supra note 328 and accompanying text.
374. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
375. See Martin H. Malin, Fathers and Parental Leave, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1047, 1077–79
(1994); Malin, supra note 100, at 39–42; Selmi, supra note 100, at 711–12.
376. See, e.g., Erin L. Kelly, Failure to Update: An Institutional Perspective on
Noncompliance with the Family and Medical Leave Act, 44 L. & SOC’Y REV. 33, 59 (2010)
(quoting one survey respondent as describing the common attitude that: “You don’t pay dads
to take time off to be home to take care of the children. Just forget it, that’s ridiculous. I
never did it. Forget it. My wife takes care of that stuff.”).
377. See, e.g., Jennifer L. Hook, Care in Context: Men’s Unpaid Work in 20 Countries,
1965–2003, 71 AM. SOC. REV. 639, 643–44 (2006) (summarizing past sociological research
on this phenomenon). Hook’s research concludes that married, employed men in countries
that offer gender-neutral parental leave do more unpaid work than men in countries that offer
leave only to women. Id. at 653.
378. Katie L. Winder, Flexible Scheduling and the Gender Wage Gap, 9 BERKELEY ELEC.
J. ECON. ANALYSIS & POL’Y 1, 1 (2009), http://www.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
article=2197&context=bejeap.
379. Estevão & Sá, supra note 119, at 455; see also Michelle A. Travis, What a
Difference a Day Makes, or Does It? Work/Family Balance and the Four-Day Work Week,
42 CONN. L. REV. 1223, 1239 (2010) (citing Arturo Vega & Michael J. Gilbert, Longer Days,
Shorter Weeks: Compressed Work Weeks in Policing, 26 PUB. PERSONNEL MGMT. 391
(1997)) (discussing Vega and Gilbert’s study of compressed work weeks for “nearly allmale” patrol officers, in which 85.3% of respondents reported that the most favorable benefit
of the new schedule was that it allowed them to work second jobs).
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article.”380 Some research suggests that “fathers step in to assist with housework
only when mothers are not available.”381 Consistent with this premise, another
study found that men who take advantage of leave policies engage in larger shares
of the types of repetitive and time-sensitive housekeeping traditionally performed
by women, like cooking, cleaning, and laundry.382 The same is not true, however,
of men who take advantage of flexible work arrangements.383 The reason may be
related to research demonstrating that married men who work shifts that do not
overlap with their wives’ (in other words, men who are home alone) do a larger
share of the housework than other men.384 Thus, policies that create incentives for
men (or both parents, to put it neutrally) to take leave may better undermine the
gendered division of labor than generic workplace accommodations.
c. Legitimating Inflexible Work Structures
Giving certain workers accommodations as exceptions to the norm of inflexible
work legitimates inflexible work structures. Many workplaces are still centered
around the norm of the husband earning the “family wage” while the wife stays
home, even though only sixteen percent of American families fit this mold.385 The
ideal worker is one who can devote absolute attention to work.386 Work-life
initiatives that look like special benefits “may inure management to the real sources
of work-life imbalance”—“how jobs are designed, how work is coordinated, how
organizational rewards are determined, and how the culture supports or hinders
work-life balance.”387

380. Joan C. Williams, Reconstructive Feminism: Changing the Way We Talk About
Gender and Work Thirty Years After the PDA, 21 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 79, 89 (2009). This
anecdote leaves me wondering whether the father who went to Mardi Gras spent the whole
semester on Bourbon Street or eventually made it back home to help with childcare.
381. Mary C. Noonan, Sarah Beth Estes & Jennifer L. Glass, Do Workplace Flexibility
Policies Influence Time Spent in Domestic Labor?, 28 J. FAM. ISSUES 263, 283 (2007). When
women use certain flexible work arrangements, like working from home or reduced work
hours, those women do more housework and childcare. Id. at 266–67. When women use
flexible work scheduling, however, men do more housework, perhaps because their wives
are not home during mornings and evenings when many routine family care obligations
arise. Id. at 267. The study did not find that a father’s use of flexible work arrangements
affected a mother’s domestic labor. Id.
382. Sarah Beth Estes, Mary C. Noonan & David J. Maume, Is Work-Family Policy Use
Related to the Gendered Division of Housework?, 28 J. FAM. ECON. ISSUES 527, 538 (2007).
383. Id. at 542.
384. Noonan, supra note 381, at 267 (analyzing data from a longitudinal sample of 196
women who were pregnant and postpartum in the 1990s).
385. See America’s Families and Living Arrangements: 2010, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
tbl.FG10, http://www.census.gov/population/www/socdemo/hh-fam/cps2010.html (providing
that there are 83,617,000 family groups in the United States); id. at tbl.FG1 (providing that out
of those family groups, 13,074,000 are married couples with only the husband in the labor
force).
386. See WILLIAMS, supra note 356, at 1.
387. Cynthia A. Thompson & David J. Prottas, Elaborations on a Theme: Toward
Understanding Work-Life Culture, in WORK-LIFE POLICIES, supra note 9, at 51, 53.
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Another problem is the phenomenon described as the “time divide”—employers
have incentives to overwork salaried employees and underwork hourly
employees.388 Under the Fair Labor Standards Act, employers are not required to
pay managerial, salaried, and professional workers for overtime,389 creating
incentives for employers to hire fewer of such workers and overwork them.390
Employer benefit plans generally cover only full-time workers.391 To avoid paying
costly benefits to additional workers, employers have incentives to create part-time,
contingent, or contract positions.392 The result is a situation in which men are more
likely to have difficulty avoiding overwork and women are more likely to have
difficulty finding sufficient paid work.393 Individual accommodations that allow
certain workers to “maneuver around workplace norms that create gender
inequality” detract focus from this structural problem.394
Legitimation results both from universal accommodations and those targeted at
caregivers or women. However, if elite workers, who are more likely to be men,
benefit from accommodations like flexibility that do not increase their caregiving
relative to women, they will have no incentive to support policies to benefit all
workers.395
4. Dilution: Undermining Protections for Care
Expanding work-family policies to work-life policies may trivialize the needs of
caretakers and water down protections like parental leave. The trivialization
problem goes hand-in-hand with any solution that takes an agnostic view on which
life pursuits merit workplace accommodation. Although employers may find
caregiving responsibilities good reasons to allow worker flexibility, manicures,
fantasy football, and tropical vacations garner less sympathy. These “frivolous”
reasons for seeking flexible work arrangements threaten to undermine the entire
project, which is why advocates use examples of life pursuits like military service,
community volunteering, and disaster preparedness training. These pursuits mimic
childrearing in that they contribute to the reproduction and preservation of
American life and culture. But many work-life proposals would equally protect the

388. JACOBS & GERSON, supra note 127, at 163–64.
389. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1) (2006).
390. JACOBS & GERSON, supra note 127, at 183; Schultz & Hoffman, supra note 12, at
138–39.
391. JACOBS & GERSON, supra note 127, at 183.
392. Schultz & Hoffman, supra note 12, at 138–39.
393. Schultz, supra note 16, at 1206.
394. Id. at 1212. In response, Schultz proposes a universal solution: the thirty-five-hour
workweek. This Article does not specifically address whether the thirty-five-hour workweek,
on balance, would avoid essentialism, backlash, assimilation, and dilution; rather, it analyzes
whether rules requiring universal work-life accommodations would reinforce or ameliorate
the gendered division of labor.
395. Levmore, supra note 114, at 217–18 (“Employers have incentives to offer generous
benefits, in lieu of cash, to employees who value these benefits and who value the signal the
employer sends about its willingness to accommodate or attract workers who expect to be
parents. But once these employees are satisfied, they have no incentive to work through the
political process for more generous leave policies for all employees.”).
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worker who just wants to spend more time watching television. If a work-life
policy leads to widespread freeriding and abuse, the entire endeavor is at risk.
Indeed, support has now waned for leave in general because the FMLA is utilized
for many short, personal sick leaves that employers perceive as costly and
illegitimate.396
Expanding leave may water down protections for caregivers. If all employees
were entitled to request leave for any reason, and employers were not be permitted
to inquire into a worker’s reasons for taking leave, then a worker who needed the
day off to take an elderly parent to a doctor’s appointment would have the same
chance of getting that accommodation as a worker who wants the day off to go
fishing.397 Or maybe neither worker will get the day off. Some employers have
reduced paid maternity leaves as family responsibilities discrimination litigation
has grown.398 One scholar argues: “If employers are required to treat women the
same as men, and to treat people with caregiving responsibilities no differently
from all other workers, the easiest way for employers to comply with
antidiscrimination law is to offer nothing to both men and women, especially in a
tough economy.”399
***
In sum, based on available empirical research on different forms of work-life
accommodation, it seems likely that universal accommodations would have some
advantages in terms of avoiding essentialism and backlash, but would not eliminate
the problems. And universal accommodation requirements risk obscuring the
connections between the lack of workplace flexibility for caretakers and the
gendered division of labor, and undermining all workplace flexibility projects
through dilution.
IV. TOWARD A MORE INCLUSIVE WORKPLACE
A. Lessons for Other Universalizing Projects
This analysis demonstrates that universalized protections may fail to advance
equality. While at first it seemed that universal rules would avoid essentialism and
backlash, a closer examination reveals that packaging reforms as benefits to “all
workers” does not necessarily strip them of their associations with identity groups.
Additionally, when they are characterized as subsuming protections against
discrimination, universal protections run the risk of evisceration-by-assimilation of

396. Suk, supra note 114, at 48.
397. See Arnow-Richman, supra note 9, at 1101 (discussing liability that may result if
employers inquire into workers’ reasons for seeking accommodations).
398. Suk, supra note 114, at 57 (“During the last ten years, as FRD litigation grew,
employers cut back on paid maternity leaves. In 1998, twenty-seven percent of a nationally
representative sample of 1100 employers provided fully paid maternity leave; only sixteen
percent provide such leave today. Over this period, the maximum length of paid leave has
decreased from 16.1 weeks to 15.2 weeks.” (footnotes omitted)).
399. Id.
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feminism as a political project, and dilution-by-expansion of antidiscrimination as a
redistributive project.
Although in theory universal protections should avoid essentialism, this is not
necessarily the case. It is true that universal solutions do not revolve around
identity claims. But like traditional civil rights protections, universalized
protections are fixated on individuals—changing people rather than workplaces.
Universal protections may open new avenues for enforcement of stereotypes and
generalizations, for example, about what sort of conduct is bullying and what sort
of workers deserve accommodation. Courts, employers, and the public may import
essentialist notions in interpreting, enforcing, and understanding universal laws.
While sexual harassment laws imagine women as imperiled victims, anti-bullying
laws imagine them as dragon-ladies. While family-leave policies imagine women
as needy mothers, work-life policies imagine them walking a tightrope. It would
not be strategic to embrace any of these essentialist notions.
Universal solutions do not necessarily avoid the backlash resulting from identity
politics. To be sure, moving beyond equality to universalism can be politically
savvy.400 Crafting solutions that are universally available may reveal the value of
reforms for more workers. However, whether this approach works to quell political
dissensus will depend on the strength of the competing interests at stake. For
example, religious conservatives who oppose extension of anti-harassment rules to
harassment based on sexual orientation may also oppose generic anti-harassment
rules.401 But gay-rights groups may not see the benefit of expending resources on
the anti-bullying cause. Work-life initiatives may find support from women’s
groups, but at the cost of becoming “mommy tracks.”
Universal protections can eviscerate feminist political goals through
assimilation. Movements for equality risk death by absorption into universalistic
politics. Antidiscrimination rules require employers to ask, “am I treating anyone
differently because of gender?” while universal rules require employers to ask, “is
this workplace too hostile or inflexible?” If the universal rule swallows the
antidiscrimination rule, the transformative potential of requiring employers and the
public to scrutinize whether employment decisions are gendered is lost. Rules
protecting dignity or liberty may end up replicating inequality. The law has trouble
recognizing indignities to those at the bottom of class hierarchies, for example,
those who already do “menial” work, or threats to the liberty of those constrained
by gender norms, for example, couples who “choose” traditional breadwinnercaregiver family arrangements.402 A theory of universalism that imagines the
sphere of universal harms as subsuming gendered harms could become part of a
“post-feminist” political project that either denies the existence of gender inequality

400. See Fineman, supra note 12, at 17 (“The realization that disadvantage is produced
independent of racial and gender biases in many—but of course not all—instances provides
an important political tool. Mobilizing around the concept of shared, inevitable vulnerability
may allow us to more easily build coalitions . . . .”).
401. See supra notes 240–42 and accompanying text.
402. This is not to say that couples who organize their work and family lives according to
the traditional model suffer from some form of false consciousness, just that we cannot
determine whether they would have made the same “choices” if they had been presented
with different options for combining career and family.
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or chalks it up to personal choices rather than economic and political structures.
Compliance efforts that focus on weeding the bad seeds out of the workplace or
creating new tracks for non-ideal workers may mask deeper problems.
Finally, universal policies have the potential to water down existing protections.
Cases on the fringe of bullying resemble office politics, and cases on the fringe of
work-life accommodation resemble free riding. The fringe cases threaten to
trivialize the entire endeavor and undermine the core of protections. Due to limited
resources, the requirement that all protections be universal may result in no
protections at all.
Yet the disadvantages to universal rules described in Part III of this Article are
not reasons to completely abandon universalizing projects. To return to Part I of
this Article: sexual harassment law and family leave policy are tragically
underinclusive. Cases are hard to win because bias is difficult to prove. Many
workers are not covered by existing rules, such as those harassed because of sexual
orientation, physical appearance, or native language, or those with nontraditional
families or personal lives. The harms of harassment and inflexible work are
widespread. Why should any worker be required to risk dignity, liberty, health, or
safety to earn a living?403 Some types of anti-bullying and work-life policies might
provide recourse to those left out by current laws while avoiding the problematic
fixation with sex and family.
B. Reframing the Discussion to Focus on Inclusivity
There is no tidy solution to the dilemma posed by this Article: that gender issues
may point to larger problems with the structure of the workplace, but universal
solutions may create new gender issues. Is there is a way to provide universal
protection without undermining equality? To minimize the tradeoffs between
universality and equality, I propose that goals be reframed in terms of making
workplaces more inclusive.404
This Article does not conclude that there is nothing to be gained from
universalist theories or that unhinging legal protections from identities is never a
good move. There are likely to be cases in which a policy grounded in an identity
category is so woefully underinclusive, essentialist, and divisive that a universal
policy would be an improvement regardless of the risks of assimilation and

403. Cf. Susan Sturm & Lani Guinier, The Future of Affirmative Action: Reclaiming the
Innovative Ideal, 84 CAL. L. REV. 953, 957–58 (1996) (arguing that affirmative action
presents “an opportunity to take from the margin to rethink the whole” by asking larger
questions about the fairness of one-size-fits-all merit-based selection systems for everyone).
404. Cf. powell, supra note 22, at 802–03 (proposing “targeted universalism” that would
be “inclusive of the needs of both the dominant and the marginal groups, but pays particular
attention to the situation of the marginal group”); Susan Sturm, The Architecture of
Inclusion: Advancing Workplace Equity in Higher Education, 29 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 247,
250 (2006) (supporting a “project of achieving inclusive institutions” that goes beyond
“eliminating discrimination or even increasing the representation of previously excluded
groups” to “creat[e] the conditions enabling people of all races and genders to realize their
capabilities as they understand them”).
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dilution.405 However, the bullying and work-life examples demonstrate that
universal moves should be made with caution. Universality and equality can be
conflicting goals. Universal protections take aim at harms that affect all workers at
the risk of ignoring how those harms are gendered and how uniform solutions may
only assist privileged workers. Equality-based protections take aim at harms that
affect women at the risk of ignoring harms to all workers, expressing essentialist
notions, and sparking divisive identity politics.
Inclusiveness is not the same as equality. Equality requires eliminating disparate
treatment or subordination. Inclusiveness requires constant reconsideration of how
legal rules and workplace structures exclude certain workers. The inquiry would
not stop at asking whether men and women are treated the same, but it would also
ask, for example, why workers aren’t protected against discrimination on the basis
of sexual orientation, or discrimination based on the intersection of race and
gender. An inclusive approach would not abandon universalist goals like liberty
and dignity; rather, it would insist on equal liberty and dignity.406 To insist on bare
equality of treatment, without reference to other values, is to repeat the mistake of
the anticlassification paradigm—ignoring the interplay between legal rules and
status hierarchies.407 It is also to miss the potential of equality norms to spark reevaluation of universal standards. Equality-based movements can bring problems to
light that require that we lift the floor for everyone, rather than simply equalize
conditions.408 We can “understand[] accommodation as a process of interrogating
the existing baseline, by focusing on part of the population that was neglected in
the creation of that baseline, to make changes to that baseline that may affect
everyone.”409 An inclusive approach would not require blanket rejection of
protections based on universal norms. Rather, it would not allow universal norms to
eclipse equality concerns, by requiring careful consideration of potential problems
such as assimilation and dilution.
Neither is inclusiveness the same as universality. To make a workplace more
inclusive, reformers must pay attention not just to the commonalities between
workers’ problems, but also the differences. Otherwise, the problems of those

405. One likely example is the recasting of sex trafficking as human trafficking. See
Chuang, supra note 27.
406. Cf. Neil S. Siegel, “Equal Citizenship Stature”: Justice Ginsburg’s Constitutional
Vision, 43 N.E. L. REV. 799, 840 (2009) (explaining how Justice Ginsburg’s constitutional
“vision encompasses both an equality and a liberty component”).
407. Balkin & Siegel, supra note 129, at 13–14 (describing how anticlassification norms
are implemented along with other norms that may either preserve or dismantle social
relations).
408. Siegel, supra note 406, at 840–41 (arguing for a constitutional vision of equal liberty
that recognizes “a floor, an irreducible minimum of autonomy that government must accord
each person regardless of how it treats other persons—a zone of individual freedom into
which government may not intrude”).
409. Elizabeth F. Emens, Integrating Accommodation, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 839, 894
(2008) (recognizing that a model that “treats disability as a lens through which to see the
need for universal improvements” risks losing “disabled people and their particular needs . . .
in the mix” and “[t]he whole idea of accommodation risks dissolving into a general social
welfare program in which disabled people’s needs matter no more and no less than anyone
else’s”).
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disadvantaged by race, gender, class, and other hierarchies are likely to be
overlooked. Gender subordination will be considered a thing of the past and the
manner in which gender subordination continues today will become difficult to
discern. Thus, legal rules must continue to focus on inequality. But not all
differences can always be accommodated. An approach that aims to increase
inclusiveness would confront potential costs and tradeoffs rather than attempting to
take a universal shortcut around difficult debates over recognition of differences in
the workplace. It would forgo appeals to the universal high ground in favor of
finding common ground between workers and revealing second- and third-party
benefits.410 It would reject universal solutions, realizing that achieving greater
inclusiveness is always an unfinished project.411
An inclusive approach requires expansion of workplace protections, but not at
the expense of marginalized and vulnerable workers. Thus, it requires consideration
not just of the benefits of greater inclusivity, but also critical examination of
whether universal expansion would have advantages in terms of avoiding
essentialism and backlash, and disadvantages in terms of assimilation and dilution.
C. Inclusive Approaches to Harassment and Work-Life Conflicts
This Part offers some preliminary suggestions for achieving greater
inclusiveness by eliminating harassment and work-life conflicts. In accord with a
paradigm of inclusiveness, harassment and work-life conflicts should be addressed
by solutions that (1) avoid assimilation and dilution by maintaining attention to
gender and other forms of discrimination, (2) avoid essentialism and identity
politics by focusing on eliminating discrimination, rather than enforcing particular
norms about gender, sex, and family, and (3) remedy underinclusiveness by
gradually expanding protections to other forms of discrimination and
experimenting with flexible solutions to universal harms.
The law should continue to focus on discrimination to avoid the assimilation and
dilution problems. Despite their limitations and problems, civil rights laws have
been successful in alleviating many of the most harmful forms of discrimination.
Sexual harassment law has changed cultural norms and eliminated many forms of
egregious workplace behavior.412 Millions utilize the FMLA’s leave provisions
every year.413 Plaintiffs have achieved notable successes in litigating family

410. For a discussion of second- and third-party benefits, see id. at 873–74.
411. “[I]nclusiveness is an ideal, an ideal that is impossible to realize, but whose
unrealizability nevertheless governs the way in which a radical democratic project
proceeds.” Letter from Judith Butler to Ernesto Laclau (May 1995), in The Uses of Equality,
27 DIACRITICS 3, 4 (Reinaldo Laddaga ed., 1997). A project based on inclusiveness is
“bound to fail . . . because the various differences that are to be included within the polity are
not given in advance.” Id. Those differences are always “in the process of being formulated
and elaborated.” Id.
412. See, e.g., Judith Resnik, The Rights of Remedies: Collective Accountings for and
Insuring Against the Harms of Sexual Harassment, in DIRECTIONS IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT
LAW, supra note 47, at 247, 251–52.
413. The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 73 Fed. Reg. 67,934, 68,042 (Nov. 17,
2008) (amending 29 C.F.R. pt. 825 (2008)) (estimating that seven million workers took

1284

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 86:1219

responsibilities discrimination cases.414 In anthropological terms, these laws have
created awareness of discrimination by allowing plaintiffs to “name” the harms
they suffered, “blame” their employers, and “claim” legal remedies.415 Grouping
these well recognized forms of discrimination together with nondiscriminatory
harms could eliminate opportunities to redress “specific instances of explicit
discrimination that might be more effectively managed through straightforward
rights claiming.”416 Civil rights laws must continue to play a role as “backstop[s]”
against classic forms of discrimination, such as sexual coercion in the workplace,
or firing a worker for taking family leave.417
Discriminatory harms are of a different character than harms that affect all
workers. Universal solutions, at least on paper, would not judge between claims
based on sexual orientation, marital, parental, or other status.418 But in their
agnosticism, universal rules fail to treat discriminatory harassment any worse than
personality conflicts, and fail to protect caregiving responsibilities any better than
leisure pursuits. This is not to say that anyone deserves to be bullied or that leisure
time is not worthy of protection, but rather that these problems are of a different
order than those linked with discrimination.419 Discriminatory harassment and a
workplace that is incompatible with caretaking obligations are legacies of women’s
historical marginalization in paid labor (and the inextricably related problem of
men’s exclusion from caretaking).420 These problems contribute to women’s
continued disadvantage today.421 Discrimination is a “vicious cycle of exclusion” in
which those who are subordinated face stereotypes and stigmatization, causing
them to believe they will be denied opportunities, causing them to “choose” not to
develop their human capital, causing them to be denied opportunities and
perpetuating stereotypes and stigmatization.422 Antidiscrimination rules target this
FMLA leave in 2005).
414. See Joan C. Williams & Nancy Segal, Beyond the Maternal Wall: Relief for Family
Caregivers Who Are Discriminated Against on the Job, 26 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 77, 122–61
(2003).
415. See Resnik, supra note 412, at 252 (citing William L.F. Felstiner, Richard L. Abel &
Austin Sarat, The Emergence and Transformation of Disputes: Naming, Blaming, and
Claiming . . . , 15 L. & SOC. 631 (1980–81); Austin Sarat, Naming, Blaming, and Claiming
in Popular Culture, 50 DEPAUL L. REV. 425 (2000)).
416. Douglas NeJaime, When New Governance Fails, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 323, 393 (2009).
417. Cf. Sturm, supra note 25, at 483 (discussing law’s role as backstop).
418. See supra Part I.A.2 (describing gaps in sexual harassment law); Part I.B.2
(describing gaps in family leave policy).
419. Cf. Emens, supra note 409, at 894–96.
420. As Jeremy Waldron has written,
Everyone knows that sexual and racial differences have been used in the past to
justify profound differences of treatment, rights, and social status. . . . We could
say that respect is due to humanity as such. But “equality” has the extra and
important resonance of indicating the sort of heritage we are struggling against.
Jeremy Waldron, The Substance of Equality, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1350, 1363 (1991).
421. See Abrams, supra note 254, at 1187 (“Correcting a nonsystematic problem of
disrespect is a far less urgent matter than curtailing a practice of gender discrimination,
which imposes consequences on women’s economic and personal well-being and which has
parallels throughout society.”).
422. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, “Rational Discrimination,” Accommodation, and the
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dynamic by expressing condemnation of prejudice and providing incentives for
those who are excluded to develop their human capital.423 Antidiscrimination law
disrupts “wholesale” forms of injustice that create patterns and systems of
subordination, as opposed to “retail” forms of injustice involving individual
breaches of norms of ethical conduct.424
To avoid essentialism without going so far as the universal turn,
antidiscrimination projects can be refocused from protected groups to protected
activities or prohibited forms of discrimination. Antidiscrimination projects must
attack rather than reinforce stereotypes about gender, sex, and sexuality. As
discussed in Part I of this Article, sexual harassment law and family leave policy
are being pulled away from a focus on discrimination and toward anti-sex and profamily agendas. There is a problem with sexual harassment laws that are enforced
to rid the workplace of sexuality rather than sex discrimination.425 I agree with
feminist scholars who argue that the law should prohibit any harassment in the
service of gender stereotyping or segregation.426 There is also a problem with laws
that support traditional families rather than caretaking.427 Caregivers should be
provided with paid, job-protected leave. As Gillian Lester proposes, leave should
be publicly financed to avoid the risks of employers shifting costs onto women or
other likely caretakers.428 To avoid essentialism, leave programs should be made
attractive for men as well as women. Empirical research suggests that paid leave, if
not too long in duration, increases women’s likelihood of returning to the
workforce.429 Feminists can ground arguments for prioritization of caregiving in the
state’s duty toward dependent or vulnerable citizens, rather than maternalist notions
of valuing women’s roles.430
Politics of (Disability) Civil Rights, 89 VA. L. REV. 825, 841–43 (2003) (summarizing the
sociological account of discrimination).
423. Id. at 844.
424. See id. at 837, 846–47.
425. See supra Part I.A.2.
426. See Katherine M. Franke, What’s Wrong with Sexual Harassment?, 49 STAN. L.
REV. 691, 745 (1997) (proposing conceptualizing harassment as conduct “used to enforce or
perpetuate gender norms and stereotypes”); Schultz, supra note 6, at 2173 (proposing that
the definition of sex harassment include “any type of conduct that occurs because of sex—
regardless of whether it is sexual, nonsexual but overtly sexist, or even gender-neutral in
content” (emphasis in original)).
427. See supra Part I.B.2.
428. See, e.g., Lester, supra note 350, at 73 (proposing paid family leave financed
through across-the-board payroll taxes or general revenue).
429. Christopher J. Ruhm, The Economic Consequences of Parental Leave Mandates:
Lessons from Europe, 113 Q.J. ECON. 285, 287 (1998).
430. See MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE AUTONOMY MYTH: A THEORY OF
DEPENDENCY 178 (2004) (arguing that preoccupation with autonomy has prevented
Americans from seeing that we are all dependents at various points in our lives, and
proposing that the state support dependent children, the elderly, the disabled, and those who
care for them); Maxine Eichner, Dependency and the Liberal Polity: On Martha Fineman’s
The Autonomy Myth, 93 CAL. L. REV. 1285, 1287 (2005); Fineman, supra note 12, at 23
(“Equality must be a universal resource, a radical guarantee that is a benefit for all. We must
begin to think of the state’s commitment to equality as one rooted in an understanding of
vulnerability and dependency, recognizing that autonomy is not a naturally occurring
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To avoid underinclusiveness, antidiscrimination protections in the workplace
should be gradually expanded to include new forms of discrimination that are
analogous to the old; for example, discrimination based on sexual orientation
should be prohibited. Such expansions entail identity politics, but, as this analysis
demonstrates, anti-bullying laws and universal leave policies would entail the same
political backlash.
Finally, further study and experimentation is required to address universal
harms, like nondiscriminatory bullying or work-life conflicts unrelated to
caretaking responsibilities. Such experimentation could take the form of
requirements that employers engage in problem solving to devise solutions to
bullying and work-life conflicts together with employees, government agencies,
and other stakeholders.431 For example, the mandate of an administrative agency,
such as the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), could be
expanded to address bullying.432 OSHA has recognized workplace violence as a
threat to health and safety,433 and has issued guidelines for prevention of violence
in high-risk industries.434 Similar approaches could be applied to address work-life
conflicts. Private solutions that transform workplace norms for everyone, instead of
creating new tracks as exceptions to the norm, are appealing experiments.435
Flexible regulatory mechanisms, with a focus on open-ended procedure over
defined substance, would be good ways to test out solutions before risking the
assimilation or dilution of antidiscrimination norms.436 Moreover, the types of
structural and cultural changes required to resolve the broad array of problems that
have been labeled “bullying” and “work-life conflicts” will differ from workplace
to workplace. A proliferation of workplace-level approaches, rather than universal
legal prohibitions, would allow experimentation and study to determine best
practices, with attention to whether the new programs contribute to or diminish
status hierarchies.437
characteristic of the human condition, but a product of social policy.”).
431. Cf. Sturm, supra note 25, at 539 (cautioning against “superimposing universal
solutions over an area where culture and context are key to effective problem solving and
normative elaboration”).
432. See 29 U.S.C. § 651(b) (2006); Harthill, supra note 8, at 1251.
433. See, e.g., OSHA Interpretive Letter from Richard E. Fairfax, OSHA Director, to
Morgan Melekos (Sept. 13, 2006), available at http://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.
show_document?p_table=INTERPRETATIONS&p_id=25504.
434. See OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN., OSHA PUB. NO. 3148-01R,
GUIDELINES FOR PREVENTING WORKPLACE VIOLENCE FOR HEALTH CARE AND SOCIAL
SERVICES WORKERS (2004), available at http://www.osha.gov/Publications/osha3148.pdf.
435. See LOTTE BAILYN, BREAKING THE MOLD: REDESIGNING WORK FOR PRODUCTIVE
AND SATISFYING LIVES 10 (Cornell Univ. 2006) (1993) (setting out a normative vision of “[a]
world in which care and community are valued and legitimated, where boundaries between
family and work and between male and female roles are permeable, and where
organizational processes are linked to the social needs of the society”); Moen et al., supra
note 331, at 101–03 (describing Best Buy’s “results-only work environment” project, which
originated with two female in-house human resources professionals and attempted to
restructure “the temporal organization of jobs”).
436. Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits of Antidiscrimination
Law, 94 CAL. L. REV 1, 34–37 (2006).
437. Cf. Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic
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CONCLUSION
As an end goal, universal protection has great appeal. The arguments for
universal protection demonstrate how “women’s issues” point to problems in the
structure of the workplace for everyone. But viewed through an antidiscrimination
lens, a civility code for the American workplace would have significant drawbacks.
Extending the civil rights model to the problems of bullying and work-life conflicts
could backfire for those committed to equality, inviting overzealous enforcement of
gendered norms masquerading as civility codes, making inequality invisible, and
diluting protections. Closer examination reveals that although the problem of the
hostile workplace is universal, there is no one-size-fits-all solution. To better fulfill
the universal turn’s promise of inclusivity, reformers must consider the conflicts
between equality and universalist projects.

Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267, 314–15 (1998). But see David Zaring, Best
Practices, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 294, 300–01 (2006) (concluding that best practices are
effective in gaining compliance from regulated entities, but may not result in the “best”
practices being adopted, and suggesting congressional or agency oversight to improve bestpractice rulemaking). On the other hand, some types of civil rights rules might allow just as
much experimentation—for example, affirmative action programs that give employers
numerical targets and timetables, and allow employers discretion to determine how to reach
those targets. I am grateful to Vicki Schultz for raising this point and providing the
affirmative action example.

